










AIRPORT CITY LIMITS: 
 
A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF 
















A Masters Project submitted to the faculty 
of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of Master of Regional Planning 





























There are some who say that          
communism is the wave of the 
future.  Let them come to Berlin. 
 






A large airport and its “airport city” can be a regional economic driver.  Berlin—capital 
of a rich nation yet home to a stagnant economy—is building a new airport.  The 
government is involved on many different levels, as it hopes this new airport, Berlin 
Brandenburg International, can spur economic development.  The best and chosen site for 
this new airport is actually an old one, Schönefeld, yet old airports tend to be near 
settlements dense enough to cause substantial pushback from some of the neighboring 
population.  The inevitable anti-airport protest recently has produced a legal settlement 
that allows for the new airport’s construction, but it curtails certain aspects that would 
make it more of an economic driver.  Also, the various levels of government have 
competing motives for what sort of “airport city” development occurs nearby. 
 
This paper examines the projected impacts—both positive and negative—that Berlin 
Brandenburg International airport is likely to produce.  It also evaluates other claims and 
projections made by those for and against its construction, by placing commercial 
aviation in Berlin in the contexts of Germany and Europe.  Next, it critiques the airport 
planning process and identifies the process’s stakeholders, ascribing the potential impacts 
to each stakeholder, given three scenarios of what might happen.  Finally, it recommends 
possible steps to improve outcomes, in Berlin or elsewhere. 
 
Berlin will build a new airport that will meet passenger demands for the foreseeable 
future.  The airport will be a regional transportation node, for areas beyond Berlin and 
Brandenburg (and even for western Poland).  However, the ban on nightflights and the 
lack of inter-jurisdictional and public-private cooperation on “airport city” development 
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1. Introduction and background 
 
The story of Berlin’s airports is the story of the city itself.  From the idiosyncratic 
pioneers of aviation to fascist design and planning, and from the Berlin Airlift to German 
Reunification, the city’s 20th-Century saga can in large part be told by the history of its 
various Flughaefen.  The current chapter features Berlin’s three-airport system 
consolidating into a single site: Berlin-Brandenburg International (BBI).  This paper 
analyzes and evaluates the contentions on either side of this massive development.  It is a 
case study of the Berlin airport system and its plans to redevelop Schönefeld into BBI.1  
This paper will provide historical context to the present debate, assess the current 
situation, and measure forecasts used by both the airport authority and the relevant 
literature. 
An airport is a major infrastructure project, and thus a decade-long drama with 
enormous impacts on transportation, economic development, and public investment.  
Berlin’s new airport will be a redevelopment of an old one, Schönefeld, built by East 
Germany.2  The area’s initial, post-reunification optimism has passed, revealing 
weaknesses in the urban, regional and national spatial-economic structures.  These are 
weaknesses that, counter-cyclically, BBI hopes to overcome as a new economic driver of 
the region.  Meanwhile, reunification has allowed for citizens of the erstwhile East 
Germany to openly object to the government’s airport plan, partaking in the long-denied 
                                                 
1 Schönefeld is the name of an airport, a village, and a municipality.  In this paper, the word used alone will 
refer to the airport.  The village or Gemeinde (municipality) will appear with its label. 
2 “East Germany” refers to the Deutsche Demokratische Republik.  “West Germany” refers to the 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland from 1949 to 1990.  The paper uses the term “Federal Government” to refer to 
the Bundesrepublik Deutschland after German Reunification. 
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politics of democratic recourse and mass protest.  Due to the universality of these issues, 
large cities the world over can learn from Berlin’s current experience. 
A new airport is a statement of civic prominence and public art, not just a place 
where people get on or off planes.  Asking “What sort of airport should we build?” is also 
asking “What sort of city or region will this airport serve?”  In Berlin’s case, the answer 
has changed (and may yet change again), but when planners first posited BBI the 
aspiration was to be a “global city.”  A global city is home to financial and political 
institutions that exercise control over development and norms across the planet.  It is a 
phenomenon particular to a world with transportation and communication that have 
effectively “shrunk” the world, making the expression of such control possible.  Until 
1945, Berlin was on track to be a global city.  However, due to the polycentric nature of 
post-war Germany’s spatial-economic structure, hopes of being a global city are merely 
tantalizing. 
Many BBI forecasts pertain to how many passengers will use the new airport.  A 
starting point for projecting passenger levels is the “catchment” area residents.  The 
airport claims a catchment of 10 million, even though the city of Berlin has a population 
of only 3.4 million.  This paper tries to show where the remainder might come from.  The 
number of passengers using Berlin airports (collectively) has increased a great deal in the 
past three years, and many expect such growth to continue.  2005’s figure of 17 million 
passengers has encouraged the airport authority in its plan to build an airport to 
accommodate between 20 million and 30 million annual passengers.  This paper will 
assess whether or to what degree this trend will continue, by exploring the roles of both 
air carriers--chiefly Lufthansa—and low-cost-carriers (LCCs) in Berlin, Germany, and 
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Europe.  The recent phenomena of the airline alliance and the LCC boom are explored, 
particularly with regard to how and why airlines hub.  Also, networks for air cargo tend 
to go to either major passenger hubs or dedicated freight hubs.  This paper will project 
BBI’s future freight levels and assess its chances at becoming some type of hub. 
This paper also evaluates the arguments against BBI.  Airport opponents have 
filed four complaints in their class-action lawsuit against the development of BBI.  These 
are the accuracy and fairness of the noise contours, the legality of nightflights, the 
propriety of building the airport so close to the city, and the negative effects of 
construction on the local water supply.  In addition, some airlines that operate out of 
Tegel (one of the Berlin airports scheduled to close pending BBI completion) had sought 
to keep their base open. 
Finally, this study assesses how the airport authority, developers, and regional 
governments could realize their shared goal for BBI: maximizing the creation of local 
jobs as a result of having a new, large airport.  This paper also identifies impediments to, 
and opportunities for, BBI’s having a significant and positive economic impact, and tries 
to determine what components of the planning process can affect outcomes in airport 
development.  Finally, this paper presents three scenarios of potential airport 
development, and judges how each scenario would impact the project’s numerous 
stakeholders. 
This paper was written while the author was based in the Economic Geography 
Department of Humboldt Universität zu Berlin.  This department has produced two 
recent master’s theses on the prospects of hubbing at BBI.  Ulrich Hoffmann wrote in 
2000 that no Berlin airport would be a major hub for a passenger airline, and Martin 
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Schulte wrote in 2002 that BBI would not become a hub for air cargo.3  Today, in 2006, 
the issue is far riper, as redevelopment plans have matured and the airline industry has 
changed a great deal.  Hoffmann used 1998 data, and since then the industry has seen the 
terrorism of 9/11, the aircraft-borne SARS scare, the burgeoning popularity of low-cost 
carriers (LCCs), a sustained spike in fuel cost, and the ever strengthening role of Asian 
economies in the era of globalization.  Regarding Berlin specifically, nearby Leipzig soon 
will be a freight hub, and the lawsuit against the government’s building the airport was 
exhausted on 16 Mar 2006.  BBI deserves a new reckoning. 
 
1.1. Economic development and the significance of airports 
One could view the history of urban development as a series of phases, with each 
phase corresponding to a preeminent mode of transportation.4  Development focused near 
water for most of civilization; then, by the railway; next, by highways; and, presently, 
near airports.  For many decades cities considered airports nuisances, and consigned them 
to land on the urban periphery.5  The land-use around the airport often went unplanned, 
and a spatial mess resulted.  However, far from being just some noisy nuisance, the 
airport emerged as the new economic driver for a metropolitan region—utterly vital for 
Just-In-Time supply-chains, perishable goods, industries with a high value-to-weight 
ratio (such high-tech or bio-tech), and businessmen for whom time was at a premium.6  A 
                                                 
3 Hoffmann, U.  2000.  Hubbing als Kernelement einer modernen Netzgestaltung im Linienluftverkehr – 
Diskussion zu den Chances Berlins.  Unpublished Diplomarbeit; and Schulte, M.  2002.  Standortfaktoren 
von Luftfrachtdrehkreuzen: Untersuchung des Potentials eines Grossflughafens in der Region Berlin.  
Unpublished Diplomarbeit. 
4 Conway 1980. 
5 Conway 1980. 
6 Kasarda 2001. 
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modern airport is the nexus of industry and transportation, yet its urban development has 
been largely incoherent. 
 The discipline of economic development concerns two broad themes: job creation 
and quality-of-life.  Generally it studies private industries and public policies that succeed 
in both wealth creation and wealth distribution, as well as the methods to assess and 
forecast their impacts.  A natural subject of economic development would be a driving 
force behind a regional economy—an export-based manufacturing industry or a high-
value service sector, for example.  The development of a large international airport surely 
qualifies. 
The potential impact of an airport on the economic development of the city it 
serves is not a simple function of its sums of passengers or freight.  Many jobs and much 
investment is concentrated within the airport’s boundaries, as the aviation-related firms at 
a major airport directly employ thousands.  Also, passengers with plenty of “dwell time” 
in terminals spend a great deal of money at airports’ attractive shopping centers.  More 
dramatically, however, significant investment thoroughly develops the corridors between 
an airport and the city (or cities) it serves.  Firms that utilize air cargo see site location at 
or near an airport as a great way to maximize their competitive advantage.  Indirect 
employment from firms that support airside operations usually matches this amount.7  
For businessmen whose “time is money,” firm location near an airport has an appreciable 
time-saving advantage.  Hence, an airport’s landside economic impact can be quite 
profound, helping build an urban form near or within its boundaries. 
 
 
                                                 
7 C. Al-Khatib, FBS (personal communication 25 Jan 2006) 
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1.2. The Case of Berlin 
Berlin’s history is like no other city’s.  Unlike other divided capitals—Jerusalem, 
Belfast, Beirut, Sarajevo—Berlin is the political head of one of the world’s greatest 
economies.  Moreover, its separation was not ethnic or religious, but ideological and 
economic, so reunification and reconsolidation occurred at a relatively swift pace.  This 
pace subsumed the erstwhile East Germany, whose economy suffered a massive 
structural shift following reunification.  The collapse of its endemically uncompetitive 
manufacturing sector has contributed most to a regional economy with a high 
unemployment rate and a lack of an industrial base.  Since German Reunification and the 
return of the capital to Berlin, massive public and private investment has poured into the 
city.  While this investment did not change the economic base of the region, it provided 
the substratum of excellent infrastructure, which should improve Berlin’s attractiveness 
for industry.  A new international airport would be among the most important projects in 
a city full of them. 
1.2.i. Historical note 
The history of Berlin gives the present airport debate the proper and necessary 
context.8  The list of German pioneers of aviation features Ferdinand von Zeppelin and 
Otto Lilienthal.  Berlin’s first airport, Flughafen Tempelhof, opened in 1923.  Adolf 
Hitler may have been the first head of state to fly.9  In the mid-1930s, the head Nazi 
architect Albert Speer redesigned the Tempelhof terminal, one of this era’s few extant 
                                                 
8 Berlin is both a city—sometimes two—and a state.  For the purposes of this paper, it is important to 
recognize that Berlin is a political entity distinct from Land (the state of) Brandenburg, which surrounds it, 
and that these two states are among the sixteen that compose the country.  With reference to Berlin, the 
terms “city” and “state” are, for the purposes of this paper, interchangeable. 
9 The visual effect of the Führer descending from the heavens was not lost on Leni Riefenstal in Triumph 
des Willens. 
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monumental structures.  His design was part of a largely-unrealized urban plan for a 
north-south corridor punctuated by Berlin’s great airport—should a visitor arrive by 
plane, his first impressions of the capital of the Third Reich were to be indelible by this 
fascist “airport city.”10
The start of the Cold War saw the division of the country and the city, with both 
sides developing airports to suit their respective needs.  The French, British and 
American sectors of Berlin composed West Berlin, while the Russian sector was East 
Berlin.11  For aviation, the Russians initially utilized the Henschel Aircraftworks to the 
city’s south, and there in 1955 the East German government opened to the public 
Flughafen Schönefeld, which became the country’s main airport.12
During the 1948-49 Berlin Airlift, when the Russian army blockaded all land 
access to West Berlin, Tempelhof served as the lifeline of a starving, freezing city.  An 
estimated one plane per minute landed there, saving thousands of lives with their cargo—
and opening the world’s eyes to the potential of air freight with precise logistics.13  The 
Americans later reverted it to a commercial airport, and Tempelhof became the third-
busiest airport in Europe in the 1950s,14 but was physically inadequate for larger and 
more planes. 
West Berlin also saw the construction of a new airport during the Cold War.  In 
1960 the West German government opened Flughafen Tegel on the site of a defunct 
                                                 
10 Gordon, A.  2004.  Naked Airport.  New York: Metropolitan Books. 
11 The state of Brandenburg, which surrounds all of Berlin, was part of Russian-controlled East Germany.  
West Berlin therefore was not contiguous to “mainland” West Germany. 
12 FBS. 2006. http://www.berlin-airport.de/bbi/rubDeutsch/rubProjekt/rubRueckblick/ 
rubTraditionsstandort_Schönefeld/index.html Last accessed 7 Apr 2006; Although the terminal and the 
eponymous village lie outside the city limits and in the state of Brandenburg, a short stretch of the original 
runway passes over into Berlin.  This runway will be abandoned following redevelopment, and the airport 
will cede this land back to the respective localities: the municipality of Schönefeld and the city of Berlin. 
13 Wikipedia. 2006. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Berlin_Airlift. Last accessed 7 Apr 2006. 
14 Garriga 2003. 
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rocket factory.15  The next year East Germany erected the Berlin Wall.  West Germany 
and its allies keenly invested in the economic development of West Berlin, and 
subsidized business in the city—thus inducing business passengers who flew into Tegel 
as well as the development surrounding the airport.  Relative to this example, the socialist 
dictatorship in East Germany kept the area around Schönefeld rural, where real estate 
market forces were subsumed by state control that focused development within Berlin’s 
city limits.16
          1a:  Berlin and her airports.  From left to right: Tegel, Tempelhof, Schönefeld 
 
Source: http://vldb.informatik.hu-berlin.de 
Schönefeld was the hub for the national airline for East Germany, Interflug, which 
offered intercontinental flights (to other communist countries only) and managed all of 
                                                 
15 Airwise: Berlin-Tegel Airport History. 2006. http://www.airwise.com/airports/europe/TXL/TXL_07.html 
Last accessed 7 Apr 2006. 
16 Schulz 2000; and Freund, B., Humboldt Universität (personal communication 31 Jan 2006). 
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the country’s commercial airports.17  Following reunification, Interflug found itself in 
competition with Lufthansa—one of the world’s leading airlines—and simply could not 
cope.  A potential merger with its Western sister met with political opposition to the 
specter of a cartel, and thus was aborted.  In 1991 Interflug ceased operations and 
liquidated its Russian-built fleet.18
Tempelhof’s fate would ultimately be Tegel’s, as the impossibility of Tegel 
adapting to increases in plane size and passenger demand would make it obsolete.  The 
Berlin Wall had rendered West Berlin spatially incapable of expanding into the 
1b:  A strangled airport: Tempelhof surrounded by development 
 
Source: GEOS Berlin 
surrounding countryside, where a newer and larger airport normally would be sited.  This 
perverse sort of “urban growth boundary” hemmed in development to Tegel’s edge.  
Planes, however, did expand, and flight also became more popular and affordable, 
particularly after the liberalization following deregulation in North America and Western 
                                                 
17 Shibata 1994. 
18 Shibata 1994. 
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Europe in the late 1970s.  By the early 1980s Tegel had consolidated its position as the 
main airport for West Berlin; however, this was a pyrrhic victory, as Tegel ultimately 
would be a victim of its own success. 
Tempelhof, Tegel and Schönefeld composed a de facto airport system for the city 
of Berlin, but this system was neither competing nor concerted, but seemingly for parallel 
universes.  Tegel served the West, Schönefeld the East, and ne’er the twain did meet.  
However, the fall of the Berlin Wall and German Reunification resulted in the 
reintegration of the city of Berlin, including of course the integration of its transportation 
infrastructure.  Here now was a once-and-future capital with a surfeit of airports. 
1.2.ii. From Schönefeld to BBI 
In 1996 the ownership structure of Berlin’s airports consolidated to suit the new 
political situation.  Flughafen Berlin-Schönefeld GmbH (FBS) was formed to operate 
Schönefeld and to be the holding company of Berliner Flughaefen Gesellschaft mbH 
(BF), which runs Tempelhof and Tegel.  FBS in turn is owned by Land Berlin (37%), 
Land Brandenburg (37%), and the Federal Government (26%).  Once the redevelopment 
1c:  FBS ownership structure 
 
Source:  FBS, Check-in 
of Schönefeld is complete, the three public shareholders of FBS will sell off their 
interests, thus resulting in a private authority managing one new airport: Berlin-
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Brandenburg International (BBI).  FBS does not currently know how or when this sale 
will happen; however, once completed, this will constitute the largest airport privatization 
in continental Europe.19
From the outset, FBS planned to consolidate all commercial aviation and air cargo 
in Berlin at one airport.20  Also, since Berlin was to be the new capital of a reunited 
Germany in 2000, authorities believed that the city should have a new and large airport 
befitting a capital of a major country.21  Despite heavy public investment, the predicted 
population and economic boom never materialized, so the airport’s scale was reduced 
from 30 million to 20 million passengers per year.  The total cost for redevelopment was 
estimated at 2 billion Euros: a loan of 1.17 billion Euros, with 440 million Euros in equity 
to be generated by FBS and an additional 430 million Euros in equity from the three 
pertinent governments (proportionate to each one’s share of ownership).22  In May 2000 
FBS submitted its official redevelopment plan to the Planfeststellungsbehörde (planning 
approval office) in Potsdam, the capital of Land Brandenburg. 
The most notable feature of the plan called for the closure of both Tempelhof and 
Tegel.  The former will cease operations soon, now that legal challenges to BBI are 
exhausted, and the latter will close once Schönefeld’s redevelopment is complete (no 
sooner than 2011).23  Several airlines that used Tegel and were furious at its proposed 
                                                 
19 Airport Regions Conference 2003. 
20 C. Al-Khatib, FBS (personal communication 25 Jan 2006). 
21 E. Kulke, Humboldt Universität zu Berlin (personal communication 31 Mar 2006). 
22 C. Al-Khatib, FBS (personal communication 25 Jan 2006). 
23 Interestingly, the land for neither West Berlin airport is owned by FBS.  Tegel is the property of the 
German Air Force.  The Federal Government also owns Tempelhof’s land, while the city owns the 
historically-designated terminal, which must be preserved during any redevelopment.  FBS does own the 
land for what will become BBI. 
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closure sued to have that major element removed from the plan.  Their effort failed in 
court in late 2005.24
1d:  Map of BBI over satellite images of Schönefeld 
source: FBS 
At Schönefeld, expansion will double airside capacity, from being able to handle 
11 million passengers a year to approximately 22 million.25  The meter for the runways, 
taxiways, aprons and slots is the Airbus A-380, the newest and largest passenger plane in 
the world, holding over 700 passengers.  To accommodate such capacity, development 
will enlarge the existing main runway and add a second runway of equal proportion.  The 
original, shorter runway will be terminated. 
Like any jetport, BBI will have a massive impact on the quality-of-life for persons 
living nearby.  The new terminal will be between the two runways, on the site of the 
                                                 
24 J. Jänicke, FBS (personal communication 24 Feb 2006). 
25 J. Jänicke, FBS (personal communication 20 Jan 2006). 
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village of Diepensee.  335 residents have been relocated to two villages several 
kilometers away, called Deutsch-Wusterhausen and Grossziethen.26  Other villages in the 
area also will be negatively affected, particularly by noise, so noise contours during 
landings and takeoffs were modeled for the Planfestellungsbehörde. 
 Construction will fell 11,907 trees, and FBS must replace this number by much 
more than 100%.27  Possibilities include planting them along new greenways throughout 
the airport’s property or in new parks made from the old runway.  One particular green 
site is the Zülowniederung, a nature reserve near by the airport.  Due to the vast open 
space controlled by FBS, tree replacement will not be a problem. 
1e:  Rendering of BBI over an aerial photograph of Schönefeld 
source: FBS 
                                                 
26 J.Jänicke, FBS (personal communication 25 Jan 2006). 
27 J.Jänicke, FBS (personal communication 24 Feb 2006). 
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 In order to build the subterranean rail station beneath the terminal, construction 
will involve lowering the water table, an engineering feat with a €2,500,000 price tag.  
Such work will require a leeching ditch and pumping station within the airport.  The more 
sensitive task is monitoring the water levels outside the airport’s boundaries, as 
construction could lower the water table of a wide area.  Hence FBS has assumed 
responsibility for monitoring nearby lakes and biotopes.  For instance, if an area near by 
the airport suffers a shrinking lake, the airport must pump its displaced water into that 
lake.28
New transportation connections will make the new terminal more accessible.  
Currently one can reach Schönefeld by S-bahn, regional train, bus, and car.  (The S-Bahn 
and regional train take passengers within 2km of the terminal; from there one can walk or 
take a shuttle bus.)  New freeways will be built to provide the new terminal access to the 
city’s circumferential autobahn and to the city center.  Rail will be extended to go under 
the new terminal, bringing not only the S-Bahn and regional trains, but also providing 
fast inter-city trains, directly to BBI.  In addition, Deutsche Bahn will extend a new rail 
line north to the city center, for an express train only stopping at Papestraße (Südkreuz), 
Potsdamer Platz, and Lehrterbahnhof (Hauptbahnhof).  One will be able to check-in 
remotely at Lehrterbahnhof, and in 18 minutes arrive at the terminal.29
The Planfestellungsbehörde approved the plan on 13 August 2004, and was 
promptly sued by nearly 4,000 individuals and organizations from around the area.30  The 
complainants cited four grievances, generally concerning BBI’s environmental impacts: 
                                                 
28 C. Al-Khatib (personal communication, 25 Jan 2006). 
29 Jaenicke, J., FBS (personal communication, 20 Jan 2006). 
30 RBB Television website. http://www.rbb-online.de/_/themen/index_jsp/key=portal_3878788.html. Last 
accessed 10 Apr 2006. 
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levels of noise, propriety of nightflights, location near an urban area, and water levels.  
Organized as a class-action lawsuit, the matter was put on a fast-track, as the Federal 
Government advanced it immediately to the highest court that could hear such a case, the 
Bundesverwaltungsgericht.  The Gericht announced its conditional approval on 16 Mar 
2006.  The ensuing consolidation of commercial aviation from three airports into one will 



















2. Definitions of key concepts 
Airports are evaluated and ranked in different ways.  This paper will show how 
Berlin’s airports have ranked, and how BBI might rank, relative to other airports in 
Germany and central Europe.  BBI’s projected figures are based on the aggregate data of 
Berlin’s three airports, following the methods of the Federal Government and FBS.  In 
comparison to BBI, the study population is the seven most active airports in Germany.31  
The cut-off is at seven because only seven German airports outside Berlin average over 
2,000,000 annual passengers.  This section explains standards for measuring passengers 
and freight, as well as various quantitative indicators of “hub” status within an airline’s 
network or the global airport system. 
 
2.1 Catchment 
A basic statistic in airport analysis is “catchment,” the residents of the area within 
which an airport has a centripetal pull on the majority of passengers or freight.  It 
represents the potential for flights generated from its own area, as opposed to it being a 
destination or a transfer point.  The catchment area can be expanded through better 
regional transportation links, thus increasing the population it serves.  The Airport 
Regions Conference (ARC) uses two ratios involving catchment, as outlined by Garriga 
(2003).  The first he calls “generation,” the ratio of total annual passengers to total 
catchment inhabitants.  The second is “concentration,” the ratio of metropolitan area 
inhabitants to total catchment inhabitants. 
 
                                                 
31 The author wanted also to compare BBI with airports in other countries in central Europe, but data 
suppression was a prohibitive issue. 
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2.2 Hubs 
This paper identifies different types of hubs—major, transfer, and freight—and 
each has different indicators of its status. 
The hub is the airline industry’s preeminent organizational model and the raison 
d’etre for the world’s biggest airports.  A hub is a node in a network, a point of transfer 
for both passengers and freight.  It is an efficient way to manage a large network, 
concentrating personnel and facilities at one (usually central) location, where persons or 
goods are then transported on a long-haul flight (often to another hub), far away and with 
its own concentrated network.32  The typical airline network is called “hub-and-spoke,” 
eliciting the image of wheel.  The geography of flight networks, of course, is not a perfect 
circle.  There are different types of hubs, and—particularly for LCCs and freight—
different types of networks. 
A simple hub-and-spoke network has one central node with many exclusive links.  
A hub maximizes the potential city-pairs from a given number of flights; the easy 
contrast is with a collection of linear city-pairs.  With each new spoke on a hub, the 
number of total city-pairs increases geometrically.33  Following such a progression, a 
large transfer hub has a massive amount of potential connections.  These connections are 
timed so that flights arriving from one direction do so around the same time, so their 
passengers can connect to flights leaving hub in the same direction.  These phases of air 
traffic occur several times per day at a hub; Atlanta and Dallas-Ft.Worth each have  
 
                                                 
32 To maximize the economy-of-scale within the aircraft (i.e., to get the lowest possible unit cost per 
passenger/km or ton/km), ever larger aircraft are desired.  However, consumer demand tends to only merit 
such vast supply of seats or cargo room on intercontinental or transcontinental flights. 
33 Roberts, Roach and associates.  “How airline hubs work.”  http://www.r2ainc.com/pdfs/hubs.pdf  (Last 
accessed 28 Feb 2006). 
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Image 2a:  A simple hub-and-spoke model  Image 2b:  Point-to-point network model 
   
Source for both: Derudder, et al. (2005) 
eleven daily phases.34  This theoretical model would maximize the competitive advantage 
of such a network.  However, this theory does not match reality, as airports linked to a 
hub also have flights to each other, and often to other hubs. 
A hub requires greater infrastructure than a non-hub airport.  Often an airline or a 
cargo shipper will insist on having its own terminal.  Long-haul flights to other, distant 
hubs require wide-body aircraft, so runways, aprons, gates, et cetera, must be large 
enough to accommodate them.  Every day at a hub is a logistical masterpiece, as flights 
are orchestrated to arrive and depart in waves, in order to both (attempt to) simplify air 
traffic control and minimize passengers’ layovers.  Also, given that aircraft and personnel 
needs are likely to change in the future, it is important that a hub be able to expand. 
Hubs differ between Europe and the US, but these systems may soon converge.35 
Essentially, the US air transport network has had a continental scale since its inception, 
though this is only now becoming the case for Europe.  The European airport system 
developed with many national hubs for flag carriers, while the US system had regional 
hubs irrespective of state borders.  While a hub for a national airline tends to be at that 
nation’s capital (NB: this is not the case for Germany), many US hubs hardly qualify as 
                                                 
34 Dennis, Nigel.  “Developments of Hubbing at European Airports.”  Air & Space Europe, 3(1).  2001. 
35 Dennis 2001. 
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business, political, or tourist destinations (Salt Lake City, Cincinnati, or Cleveland, e.g.).  
Presently the European airport system is becoming as borderless as its American 
counterpart.  With the relaxation of ownership quotas, the consolidation of the primacy of 
airline alliances, and the inexorable liberalization of the airline industry in Eastern 
Europe, the dominant European airlines should preserve their rank.36
2.2.i. Major Hub 
Put simply, a major hub is a big airport.  It is where people fly from and to.  Often 
these major hubs serve cities that are both population centers and major destinations, such 
as London, New York, Paris, and Tokyo—global cities, all.  Most of the world’s biggest 
hubs are in the US, which boasts a thoroughly developed, long-time deregulated, highly 
active domestic market.  European major hubs, on the other hand, tend to have a much 
larger share of international flights, quite simply due to the geographical fact that 
European nations are much smaller than the US. 
This paper uses absolute passenger numbers for determining major hubs, and will 
not attempt to analyze the airports according to how they comport to theoretical models.  
The quick and conventional way to quantify an airport’s importance is its total annual 
passengers, which is the sum of enplaned and deplaned passengers, counting passengers 
in transit only once.37  The passenger total is the standard by which airports are ranked 
across the world, and is what persons refer to when they talk about how “big” an airport 
is; Derudder calls such an airport an “absolute” hub.  The second most-used measurement 
is total annual flights, as landing fees (regardless of the number of passengers on board) 
                                                 
36 Derudder, Ben, Devriendt, Lomme, & Wilcox, Frank. 2005. “Flying where you don’t want to go: An 
empirical analysis of hubs in the global airline network.” Global and World Cities research bulletin #187. 
www.lboro.ac.uk. Last accessed 25 Mar 2006. 
37 A passenger “in transit” stays on the plane at an airport. In essence, his connecting flight is the next 
destination of his original aircraft.  It is a phenomenon of decreasing importance in a system of hubs. 
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compose a major source of airport revenue.  These measurements’ data are reported 
monthly by airports to their respective national governments, and then are compiled by 
various groups, such as the International Air Transport Association, the International 
Civil Aviation Organization, and the Airports Council International.38  The office in 
Germany for its airports’ data is the Arbeitsgemeinschaft Deutscher Vehrkersflughaefen 
(ADV), based in Berlin.39
Derudder’s “spatial” hub attempts to show that an important hub acts a transfer 
point between other important hubs.  His measure requires knowledge of not only total 
passenger numbers but also passengers on flights to/from particular cities.  One cannot 
repeat this method without such data, which are proprietary. 
2.2.ii. Transfer Hub 
Other large hubs do not serve global cities—some not by any stretch of the 
term—but they do serve many millions of passengers who transfer to another flight.  
Typically such a transfer links airports of a tertiary importance with a major destination.  
For example, Frankfurt/Main is a massive transfer hub, with more passengers making 
transfers than actually using the airport as an origin or destination.40  Also, being a 
transfer hub can increase the multiplier of passenger numbers on airside commercial 
activity, as passengers connecting flights tend to have an hour or so of “dwell time” to 
spend money in the terminal’s shops.41  Derudder and the ARC’s Garriga both measure a 
                                                 
38 http://www.iata.org/index.htm; http://www.icao.int/; http://www.aci.aero/cda/aci/display/main/ 
aci_content.jsp?zn=aci&cp=1-2_9_2__ 
39 http://www.adv-net.org/de/gfx/index.php 
40 Derudder, et al., (2005) misrepresented the FAA’s definition of a hub, saying it was based on an airport’s 
transfer ratio, when in fact it is based on the percentage of national passengers served.  See Reynolds-
Feighan, A. 2000. “The US airport hierarchy and implications for small communities.” Urban Studies, 
37(3); and also Federal Aviation Administration. 2001. Airport activity statistics of certificated air 
carriers: Summary tables 2000. www.bts.gov/publications/. Last accessed 25 Mar 2006. 
41 Doganis, Rigas.  1992.  The Airport Business.  New York: Routledge. 
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transfer hub by the ratio of annual transfer passengers (i.e., at the airport just to catch a 
connecting flight) to total annual passengers.42  Derudder calls such a hub a “relative” 
hub, but the term “transfer” is more explicit as to the airport’s role in the global network. 
Although its hubbing focus is on aeronautical activity, a transfer hub is positioned 
well to generate non-aeronautical revenues. Naturally a transfer hub would have many 
passengers making connections, thus spending both time and money in the terminal.  It 
also would be the concentrated handling point for freight borne in the bodies of the home 
carrier’s aircraft.  Thus, with increased revenues from concessions and freight, a transfer 
hub is apt to augment the economic impact of an “airport city” development. 
One type of transfer hub is the regional hub, whose focus is a domestic network.  
Such a quality is of little and decreasing importance to Europe, given its small countries 
and political union, but it is worth mentioning.  Garriga employs a ratio to show the focus 
of an airport on its domestic flight network: an airport is a regional airport if it is a 
transfer hub with a domestic destination ratio greater than 0.8.  A domestic destination 
ratio tends to decrease as passenger numbers increase. 
Transfer data are difficult to obtain.  German airports do report transit data, which 
covers passengers who do not disembark from their plane between connections.  
According to ADV, airports kept transfer data private until approximately a decade ago, 
and today it is rarely reported—unless the airport is a transfer hub and proud of it.43  
Figures must be gleaned from cooperative airport authorities. 
When comparing large transfer hubs, it can be helpful to compare the number of 
waves of arrivals and departures.  However, this paper does not encompass such a study. 
                                                 
42 Derudder, et al., 2005; Garriga 2003; and Garriga 2004. 
43 Kuna, M., ADV (personal communication 21 Mar 2006). 
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2.2.iii. Freight Hub 
A freight hub can be a major hub, a transfer hub for a large airline, or an airport 
largely dedicated to serving a cargo integrator.  Approximately half of all air cargo 
travels in the belly of wide-body/long-haul aircraft, which predominately serve major 
hubs.44  As with passenger traffic, hubs dominate the network: In 2003, the four largest 
European hubs accounted for 50% of continental air freight and 42% of the long-haul 
frequencies.45  On the other hand, dedicated freighters deliberately seek hubs at airports 
that are not crowded, major hubs.  In order to be attractive to freighters, an airport must 
allow nightflights, have runways and facilities capable of handling wide-body aircraft, 
and suffer no slot constraints.46  There are significant economic consequences to being a 
freight hub, which have been studied by Kasarda.47  Air cargo both facilitates and creates 
trade, functioning as both the connection and catalyst of global supply-chains.48  Supply-
chains are dependent on the speed of a global network, and air freight is the fastest and 
best way to maintain competitive advantage.  This advantage can be augmented by 
locating a firm near (or at) an air freight facility, thus enhancing an “airport city” 
development.49
Freight analyses compare annual metric tons, both loaded and unloaded.  Freight 
in transit is negligible in Germany, and is not included in this study.50  Garriga employed 
                                                 
44 Airport Regions Conference. 2003. Air freight and airport regions. http://www.airportregions.org/ 
publications/arc_studies.htm. Last accessed 25 Mar 2006. 
45 ibid. 
46 ibid. 
47 Kasarda, J. D. 2001. From airport city to aerotropolis. Airport World, 6(4). 
48 Kasarda, J. D., & Sullivan, D. 2006. Air cargo, liberalization, and economic development. Annals of Air 
and Space Law, 31. 
49 Kasarda, J. D., & Green, J. 2005. “Air cargo as an economic development engine: Opportunities and 
constraints.” Unpublished article. 
50 Freight in transit amounts to an additional 2%, and is evenly spread across all airports reporting to the 
ADV.  Freight in transit is significant for an airport such as Anchorage, not one in Western Europe. 
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a freight ratio of kilograms-to-millions of passengers.  Kasarda also used indicators of 
liberalization and transparency (the number of bilateral agreements, customs quality, 
corruption ratings, e.g.), but such measures are more discriminating when covering the 
developing world.  Furthermore, the EU has assumed all of its member states’ bilateral 
agreements with the US, reducing that indicator’s utility.51   
 
2.3 Connectivity, centrality, and frequency 
Connectivity describes how many potential destinations to which one can fly from 
an airport.  It is a fundamental quality of a hub.  There are several ways to determine 
connectivity, and this paper follows the simplest: the ARC measures connectivity as the 
number of daily destinations.52  Garriga also expounded on a “second-degree 
connectivity” (similar to centrality).  In his 2000 thesis evaluating BBI’s chance at being 
a hub, Hoffmann used total number of destinations as his measure of connectivity.  This 
paper acknowledges that counting only daily destinations may be too restrictive, as some 
connections are weekly, some weekdays only, and many seasonal.  However, such a 
method follows the literature and is relatively easy to measure. 
Centrality distinguishes primacy among hubs.  Connectivity can be confused with 
centrality, perhaps because the former is easier to determine.  Centrality shows what pure 
connectivity cannot: the importance of a node in its network.  While a major, well-
connected hub is certainly an important node in its immediate network, it is not 
necessarily as important in the extended, global network.  In order to name a hub 
                                                 
51 European Union. 2006. Air transport. http://europa.eu.int/comm/transport/air/  Last accessed 25 Mar 
2006. 
52 Garriga, J. C. 2003. Airport dynamics towards airport systems. Prepared for the Airport Regions 
Conference. http://www.airportregions.org/publications/arc_studies.htm. Last accessed 26 Mar 2006. 
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“central” to the overall network, one must weigh not just its connectivity but also the 
second iteration of that connectivity.  For example, theoretically an airport could exist as 
a hub to a self-contained network of city-pairs, whose destinations have few other flights.  
Meanwhile, another airport could exist that linked only to a few airports, all of which are 
major hubs.  The latter airport probably would be more central to the overall network—
not because of its own connectivity, but because of the connectivity of its handful of 
connections.  There is no settled method in determining the centrality of a hub.  
According to eigenvector network analysis, the value of a node is equal to the sum of the 
number of links that each other node to which that node is linked has.53  Given that 
Frankfurt/Main alone has over 200 daily connections, this measurement requires 
exhaustive data from around the world.  This paper does not attempt to measure 
centrality. 
Frequency reflects the rate at which certain flights are made; it shows the intensity 
of an airport’s connectivity.  This paper measures the rate at which all flights at an airport 
are made; a further analysis would study the rate of specific city-pair connections.  
Frequency compensates for the fact that connections are of varying convenience or 
popularity—for example, the Berlin connection to Munich is far more frequent than its 
connection to New York/Kennedy, even though the latter is the bigger hub.  It follows 
that more passengers fly between city-pairs with high frequencies.  However, this is not 
always the case, since very frequent connections tend to be flown by smaller aircraft 
(with fewer passengers per flight), given their much faster turn-around times and lower 
personnel requirements.  Some frequencies are for workdays only, and focus on business 
travelers and destinations.  Others are for weekend holidays, which can very according to 
                                                 
53 Wikipedia. 2006. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eigenvector_centrality Last accessed 7 Apr 2006. 
 29
the season.  At any rate, one can glean flight frequencies with ease, but the numbers of 
passengers on board is proprietary information. 
This paper uses flights flown on Friday, 10 March 2006, as its data for 
connectivity and frequency.  The date is recent, so its data are relevant.  A Friday is both 
a workday and the start of the weekend, so it captures both passenger markets.  Also, 
March falls within the winter season, so the schedule is not distorted by summer holiday 
destinations.   
 
2.4 Intercontinentalism 
Cattan uses international flights—some of which are long-haul—as a key 
indicator of a hub.54  Her metric is the share of all flights that are international.  However, 
this indicator is distorted for holiday destinations: Spain’s Costa del Sol has no hub 
airport, despite its airports’ overwhelming shares of international flights, for example. 
Archipelagic landmasses and monocentric national transportation infrastructures also 
distort this indicator—in both cases under-representing the primacy of Frankfurt/Main 
(and perhaps BBI).  This paper expands on Cattan’s metric to show an airport’s share of 
international flights that are long-haul, as an indicator of both hub primacy and freight 
activity: “intercontinentalism.” 
Much useful data are not available.  Data on the most-flown routes would be 
ideal, as city-pair passenger totals would be quite useful in determining airport primacy.  
There is no repository of this information.  For each airline, this information is 
proprietary.  Derudder got access, through an airline, to the Marketing Information Data 
                                                 
54 Cattan, N.  1995.  “Attractivity and internationalization of major European cities.”  In Urban Studies 
32(2). 
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Transfer database, which is the universal database for travel agents who book flights.55  
This study does not have access to such a resource.  Even so, it is less than ideal, because 
direct (Internet) booking is increasingly a feature in airlines’ marketing strategies and 
cost-cutting techniques.  Indeed, none of the LCC flight information would be in this 
database. 
Airports aggregate the international data to the Schengen zone, the EU, and 
Europe.  Schengen data are useful to airports for immigration purposes, but are of little 
help to this paper.  Unfortunately for data collectors, in 2003 the set of countries in the 
EU expanded from 15 to 25, rendering that classification useless when comparing data 
before and after 2003.  Hoffmann apportioned all destinations from Berlin airports into 
geographical subgroups to suggest intercontinentalism (or the lack thereof).56  The ADV 
defines “Europe” as the European continent, plus the British Isles, Iceland, and Asia 
Minor (Turkey).  It does not include Russia east of the Ural Mountains or Asian former 
Soviet states, but does include European Russia as well as Caucasian former Soviet 
states.57
Disaggregated data on destinations and origins would be quite helpful in 
determining the number and types of long-haul routes, which Cattan and Kasarda use as 
key indicators of an airport’s primacy, particularly regarding freight.  A good way to 
define “long-haul” is a flight fully beyond a day’s drive, estimated at 2,000 kilometers.  
However, while the distance from Berlin to Faro, Portugal, exceeds 2,000 kilometers, it 
would be misleading to characterize it as long-haul, because such a flight is obviously for 
tourists, and because Faro is unlikely to have much freight to ship back to the Berlin 
                                                 
55 Derudder, et al. 2005. 
56 Hoffmann 2000. 
57 Kuna, M., ADV (personal communication 21 Mar 2006). 
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market.  It might be possible to identify long-haul flights simply by the specific types of 
aircraft that fly certain routes, but that information is not readily available.  This study 
determined long-haul routes by reviewing airports’ flight schedules, and determined 
long-haul passengers from the Aussereuropa (beyond Europe) designation from the 
ADV. 
This is a case study of BBI, and not a comparative study of German or European 
airports.  Nevertheless, comparative benchmarks can be helpful in evaluating BBI 
relative to its peers.  Also, should this analysis be replicated on BBI or reproduced on 
















3. Feasibility Analysis 
3.1 Passengers 
All Berlin airports combined to serve over 17 million passengers in 2005.  Tegel 
surpassed its 2000 passenger level as early as 2003, and Schönefeld witnessed a 200% 
increase over the past two years alone.  Such growth is remarkable indeed, and 
underscores FBS’s call for a new and larger airport.  The combined passenger levels of 
Berlin’s airports has increased 41% from 2002 to 2005, more than all other airports 
reported by the ADV.58
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FBS’s original plans for BBI were formulated during an earlier optimistic growth 
projection: the five-year trend from 1995-99 was a 20% increase in passengers at all 
Berlin airports, with over 12 million in 1999.  This growth, however, occurred nearly 
                                                 
58 Due to the significant dips in passenger demand after 9/11 and SARS, it is useful to compare current 
passenger demand to its pre-9/11, “normal” level.  For annual data, one could use calendar year 2000 data 
or aggregate monthly data from September 2000 through August 2001.  This paper uses the former. 
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exclusively at Tegel, and could be seen as air transport’s correlation with worldwide 
economic growth.59  Later, when the matter was before the German supreme court (as 
well as the court of public opinion), FBS’s marketing department pointed to the more 
recent passenger growth.  This later spurt was due to Schönefeld’s LCC boom (2003-05), 
and is more likely to plateau than maintain its current rate of expansion. 
 
3.2 Catchment 
The starting point for catchment appraisal is the primary urban area that an airport 
serves; in this case, BBI alone will serve Berlin and its 3.4 million residents.  However, 
the city has not grown according to the optimistic forecasts that predicted a return to its 
status as a global city.  Indeed, Berlin has not grown at all.60  The new BBI airport will 
serve a city with a stagnant or perhaps shrinking population—possibly with a stagnant or 
perhaps shrinking economy.  But there is more to catchment calculus than the primary 
urban area.  “Greater” Berlin—including its growing suburbs in the state of 
Brandenburg—is around 4.3 million.61  Berlin and all of Brandenburg are home to over 6 
million.62  Yet the airport authority claims BBI will have a catchment of 10 million 
persons.63  At first glance this may seem pie in the sky, but with superb transportation 
infrastructure and marketing to the Polish market, this figure may not be far off the mark. 
The standard way to expand an airport’s catchment (for passengers or freight) is 
to improve its accessibility.  BBI will serve as a regional transportation node that should 
                                                 
59 Doganis, Rigas.  2006.  The airline business in the twentieth century.  2nd Ed.  New York: Routledge. 
60 Schultz, Marlies.  2000.  “Berlin: Recent issues in urban development.” Beitraege zur Regionalen 
Geographie, 52. Leipzig: Institut für Länderkunde. 
61 Gemeinsame Landesplanung Berlin-Brandenburg. 1998. Joint planning for Berlin and Brandenburg. 
Potsdam: Ministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz und Raumordnung. 
62 ibid. 
63 Jänicke, J., FBS (personal communication 20 Jan 2006). 
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do much towards achieving this goal.  New rail will be laid under the future BBI 
terminal, and fast inter-city trains will service the station.  One will be able to take an 
express train from Leipzig or Lutherstadt Wittenberg to BBI, with one or no stops and in 
under 90 minutes.  (The 120-minute express trip from Dresden or Hamburg is already 
possible, although Hamburg has its own international airport.)  Also, these trains will stop 
at the terminal, thus eradicating the annoying (and sometimes frigid) walk from the 
current station to the current terminal.  In other words, the transit from downtown Leipzig 
to BBI will be seamless.  If one were to add the Sachsendreieck to BBI’s catchment, it 
would rise to 9.2 million; adding the entire population of the State of Saxony, it would be 
10.3 million.64  One could also include the three cities of the State of Sachsen-Anhalt 
within 150 km of Berlin—Dessau, Halle and Magdeburg—thus adding another one 
million persons to BBI’s catchment.65  Hence the geography of this catchment area is not 
a circle, but a fan spreading to Berlin’s south.  BBI’s accessibility from northern 
Brandenburg or the State of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern will remain dependent on the 
autobahn, and BBI will split catchment of this sparsely populated area with Hamburg. 
An understudied segment of the Berlin catchment area is western Poland.  In 2003 
FBS estimated that 3% of its passengers were Poles, and it is likely that figure has 
increased substantially, given that Poland is now a full member of the EU.66  8.9 million 
Poles live in the four provinces that border Germany, which include the cities of 
Wroclaw, Posnan, and Szczecin.67  According to a recent study by Kilian Frey at 
                                                 
64 Statistical office of the free state of Saxony. 2006. http://www.statistik.sachsen.de/index/41zahlen-
engl/unterseite41.htm Last accessed 7 Apr 2006. 
65 Wikipedia. 2006. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sachsen-Anhalt Last accessed 7 Apr 2006. 
66 Frey, K. (personal communication 9 Mar 2006); Poles may now work in Ireland and the United 
Kingdom, to which one can fly inexpensively and directly on EasyJet from Schönefeld. 
67 ibid.; Frey cited http://www.stat.gov.pl/, but the English-language website is lacking some data. 
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Humboldt Universität zu Berlin, fully one-third of surveyed Polish passengers traveling 
to Tegel and Schönefeld hail from Szczecin.  This is not surprising, since that city is the 
closest (of the three) to Berlin and has the smallest local airport.  More significantly, 
perhaps, is that Szczecin has a privately-run, express bus that takes passengers, thrice 
daily, directly to Tegel or Schönefeld.68  Poznan and Wroclaw, on the other hand, have 
poorer connections to Berlin, and bus service is only public, so it stops at the central bus 
station in Berlin, which is quite inconvenient for those heading to an airport. 
 
3.3 Air carriers 
The airline business is a cyclical one—sensitive to oil prices, macroeconomic 
growth, and phenomena in passenger demand (such as 9/11 and SARS).  It is a schizoid 
fusion of long-term optimism with short-term uncertainty.  Articles regularly appear in 
both trade and academic journals about various aspects of the industry, but a 
comprehensive analysis is rare; the newest authoritative text is by Doganis (2006).  The 
literature has focused on the consequences of deregulation and liberalization, the 
importance of hubbing, and, more recently, the LCC phenomenon. 
Starting in the late 1970s, national governments in North America and Western 
Europe deregulated this industry while their airlines were unquestioned market leaders.  
With the best and newest planes, combined with experience in international and 
intercontinental competition, the dominant airlines in the West soon became the dominant 
airlines in the world.  The liberalized competitive environment, however, invited 
challenges from new Western carriers and emerging Asian ones.  Thus deregulation 
                                                 
68 Frey, K. (personal communication 9 Mar 2006). 
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initiated a new era for both airlines and their passengers—and, ultimately, for the airports 
that bring them together. 
Even in this era of aviation deregulation and liberalization, major air carriers 
remain the dominant force in the airport business.  Their business involves maximizing 
the competitive advantages from the hub-and-spoke network model, which necessarily 
concentrates passengers and freight throughput.  Their business also emphasizes the 
economies of scale from ever larger aircraft, particularly on long-haul flights, to reduce 
cost-per-passenger and cost-per-passenger/km.  Throughout the history of commercial 
aviation, larger planes have necessitated larger runways, different gates, and new 
terminals; if a major hub is to be viable beyond the short term, it must be able to expand. 
This paper is not about airlines or their regulation.  However, the airline business 
has suffered a sea-change over the last generation, as ever fewer airlines are protected by 
their home nations’ governments.  “Freedoms of the Air,” i.e., the rights of one country’s 
commercial aircraft in another’s airspace and airports, have exposed markets to greater 
competition and variety in commercial air service.69  A parallel development has been the 
relaxing of ownership quotas for airlines, so that, e.g., a French airline can be owned by 
Dutch investors.  The resulting phenomenon of these liberalizations is the airline alliance, 
whose geographic scope and financial might make it a major impetus behind 
contemporary airport development.  Today there are three dominant alliances, and each is 
“led” by market leaders in each continental market, supplemented by other carriers.  No 
primary or secondary carrier—for any of the three airline alliances—hub at a Berlin 
airport.  Even though alliances presently do not concern themselves with Berlin, it is 
                                                 
69 A full list of the “Freedoms of the Air” appears in the Appendix. 
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important in understanding both the aviation landscape into which BBI will be placed and 
the curious dynamic between airlines and airports. 
In some cases following deregulation, the strong got stronger.  Lufthansa and 
Flughafen Frankfurt/Main exemplify this post-liberalization success.  With little market 
restriction, no price controls, and the expansion of large domestic carriers into more 
international routes, many airlines that were dominant regionally were able to grow to be 
dominant internationally.  By extension, the airports that were these airlines’ hubs 
symbiotically shared their success. 
In other cases, the weak got weaker, and sometimes they died; the new 
competitive environment has led to some airlines’ failures.  In the US, perhaps the most 
notable airline to fold was Pan-American, one of the pioneers of commercial 
intercontinental flight.  In Europe, the failed national carriers to date are Swissair 
(Switzerland) and Sabena (Belgium).  The national carrier for East Germany, whose hub 
was Schönefeld, had a protected market, but it failed against Lufthansa after German 
Reunification.  Aer Lingus (Ireland) and Finnair (Finland) still function, but each has 
been compelled by the success of regional LCCs to restructure its business model to that 
of a glorified, government-run LCC.70
The airline alliance, in particular, is giving Europe a hierarchy of continental 
hubs, sublimating the diffusion of national hubs.  These continental hubs by and large are 
the hubs of its dominant airlines—Lufthansa, Air France / KLM, and British Airways.  
These primate airlines team with peers and vassals across the globe, in what increasingly 
resembles a dress-rehearsal for a series of massive global airline mergers once all 
                                                 
70 De Groote, P. 2005.  “The success story of European low-cost carriers in a changing world.” Global and 
World Cities research bulletin #174. www.lboro.ac.uk. Last accessed 25 Mar 2006; and Garriga 2004. 
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developed countries relax ownership quotas for their airlines.  These major hubs—
airports that had served chiefly as national hubs, with more intercontinental flights as 
bilateral agreements and liberalization allow—are suffering severe capacity constraints as 
continental hubs.  This supply constraint, in the face of ever-growing demand, has led 
airlines—chiefly Lufthansa—towards having systems of hubs.  Whether Berlin and BBI 
fit into Lufthansa’s plans is a matter for discussion. 
Through its Star Alliance—the leading alliance in the world—Lufthansa has a 
global role in commercial flight.  An airline alliance attaches national air carriers of a  
3b:  Airline Alliances’ market position and voting membership 
alliance Star Alliance Oneworld SkyTeam 
est. 2005 passengers 382,610,000 242,577,000 343,600,000 
global market share 21.3% 13.6% 19.1% 
members (country) Adria (Slovenia) Aer Lingus (Ireland) Aeromexico (Mexico) 
  Air Canada (Canada) American (US) Air France / KLM (Fra/Hol) 
European Air New Zealand (NZ) British Airways (UK) Alitalia (Italy) 
leaders in bold All Nippon (Japan) Cathay Pacific (Hong Kong) Continental (US) 
 Asiana (South Korea) Finnair (Finland) CSA Czech (Czech Rep.) 
 Austrian (Austria) Iberia (Spain) Delta (US) 
 Blue1 (Finland) Japan (Japan) Kenya (Kenya) 
 bmi (UK) LAN (Chile) Korean Air (South Korea) 
 Croatia (Croatia) Malev (Hungary) Northwest (US) 
 LOT (Poland) Qantas (Australia)  
 Lufthansa (Germany) Royal Jordanian (Jordan)  
 SAS (Den/Swe/Nor)   
 Singapore (Singapore)   
 South African (RSA)   
 Spanair (Spain)   
 SWISS (Switzerland)   
 TAP (Portugal)   
 Thai (Thailand)   
 United (US)   
 US Airways (US)   
 Varig (Brazil)   
Sources: staralliance.com, oneworld.com, skyteam.com, iata.org 
secondary stature to greater ones with a continental footprint.  Three such alliances exist, 
and Star Alliance is the first and largest.  Through it, Lufthansa is allied with Austrian 
Airlines, LOT (Poland), and SAS (Scandinavia).  This confederation is easily the 
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dominant force in commercial flight in central Europe; it chooses the hubs, not the airport 
developers.  Austrian hubs in Vienna, LOT in Warsaw, and SAS in Copenhagen. 
Eastern Europe’s role in airline alliances is secondary, if not tertiary.  Each 
alliance has a “colony” of an eastern European airline—ones Western carriers helped 
refinance and restructure before alliances were conceived in 1994.  Typically, the aircraft 
fleets of Eastern European flag carriers remain too large and too old to be competitive.  
Nevertheless, in the 1990s Lufthansa, Air France and Alitalia invested in the Polish, 
Czech and Hungarian airlines, respectively.71  Less viable airlines in Eastern Europe 
remain unaligned in the alliance wars, including Aeroflot, which would be a tantalizing 
confederate, given Russia’s continental scope and economic potential. 
To better evaluate the potential impact of BBI, one should judge how BBI would 
rank among its rivals and partners in Germany.  The below chart shows transfer activity, 
      3c:72
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71 Shibata 1994. 
72 For this and other charts, “Berlin” represents the total of the city’s three airports.  The other major 
German airports are referred to by their call-signs: FRA=Frankfurt/Main, MUC=Munich, DUS= 
Düsseldorf, STR=Stuttgart, HAM=Hamburg, HAJ=Hannover, and CGN=Cologne-Bonn. 
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with connecting passenger estimates from ADV.  For airports that are not transfer hubs—
so chosen by, in this case, Lufthansa—transfer activity is minimal.  Passenger “dwell 
time” and terminal shopping would also be relatively low. 
After the closure of Tegel and Tempelhof, BBI should have nearly 20 million 
passengers a year.  Also, with improved transportation access, BBI might increase its 
catchment beyond Brandenburg and into Saxony or Sachsen-Anhalt.  Currently, Tegel is 
the hub of the second-largest German carrier, Air Berlin, which officially partnered with 
another German carrier, dba, in January 2006.  Also, Schönefeld is the easternmost hub 
for EasyJet, one of the two most established and far-reaching LCCs.  With improved 
accessibility, a political capital to serve, and a strong presence of LCCs, BBI can be an 
excellent regional hub. 
However, it is highly unlikely that BBI would be a hub of any continental, much 
less global, significance.  The major carrier in Germany is Lufthansa, which is one of the 
premier carriers in Europe.  Lufthansa uses Frankfurt/Main as its chief hub, and was the 
original force spurring its 1994 expansion.73  Its secondary hub is Munich’s new 
Flughafen Franz Josef Strauss, which opened in 1992.  The Munich airport’s second 
terminal was finished in 2003, and operates exclusively for Star Alliance carriers.  In late 
2005 Lufthansa began its takeover of SWISS (a reincarnation of Swissair), and will use 
its hub of Zürich as another secondary hub.74  Thus, it is highly improbable for BBI to be 
a new secondary hub for Lufthansa because that airline, together with its allies, already 
has several hubs in central Europe. 
                                                 
73 Freund, B. (personal communication 31 Jan 2006). 
74 Swissair went bankrupt in 2001, and SWISS was formed a year later as a merger of Swissair and 
Crossair; Flottau, J. 2005.  “Lufthansa’s Big Footprint.” Aviation Week & Space Technology 163.18. 
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The following chart shows the connectivity and frequency of flights at the 
German airports that compose the study population.  (Frequency in this case refers to the 
frequency of all flights, and not to the frequency of flights serving a city-pair.)  This chart 
clearly shows Frankfurt/Main in the role of a major, transfer hub.  Munich is without a 
challenger as a secondary hub.  In fourth place, Berlin ranks just behind Düsseldorf. 
          3d: 
Connectivity and Frequency at German airports






















STR   HAM 
CGN 
HAJ 
Source: OAG flight guide; data for Friday 10 March 2006 
Lufthansa and Berlin do not have much of a shared history.  Following World 
War Two, the victorious Allies produced the Four Powers Agreement that attempted to 
outline the shared control of occupied Berlin.  This agreement curtailed air freedom to the 
city.  Passenger flights to West Berlin could be made only on an air carrier of an Allied 
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country, ad these turned out to be Air France, British Airways, or Pan-American.75  This 
curious restriction survived the wave of airline deregulation of the late 1970s, effectively 
denying Lufthansa air freedom in a part of its own country.  The first Lufthansa plane to 
land in Berlin (since 1945) did so in October 1990, a year after the fall of the Berlin 
Wall.76
The following chart shows German airports’ “global significance,” a function of 
intercontinentalism and connectivity.  Frankfurt/Main dwarfs the other airports, including 
its Star Alliance sister, Munich.  Berlin ranks sixth, below even Hannover. 
      3e: 
The Global Significance
of German Airports
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As the following map shows, the trifurcated airline alliances have consolidated 
their western European hubs.  Of particular interest is the boundary between Star Alliance 
                                                 
75 Kulke, E. (personal communication 2 Feb 2006); Russia’s Aeroflot served Schönefeld, but since that 
airport was also (and essentially) in Brandenburg, technically it could be served, and was, by East German-
owned Interflug. 
76 FBS. 2006. http://www.berlin-airport.de/PubEnglish/PubTegel/PubDatenFaktenTXL/ 
PubGeschichteTXL/index.html#1990. Last accessed 7 Apr 2006. 
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and SkyTeam, which resembles the Maginot Line.  Oneworld’s confederation is on 
Europe’s periphery, and serves a more archipelagic set of destinations; it has no central 
continental hub.  Just as Lufthansa ran an end-around on British Airways by acquiring 
British Midlands International Airlines, one should not be surprised if Oneworld or 
SkyTeam do likewise, and secure BBI as a hub amid Star’s Teutonic fortress.77
3f:  Europe, colored to the alliance that dominates each large airport 
 
BBI’s becoming an end-around for SkyTeam or Oneworld would be its best 
chance at being a major hub.  Lufthansa has little history with Berlin and is not 
                                                 
77 Varlet, Jean.  1992.  “L’Interconnexion des reseaux de transport en Europe.” Etudes & Documents, 24(1). 
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enthusiastic about the closure of Tegel.78  Meanwhile, the third-largest airline in 
Germany, dba, was founded by British Airways (to secure flights to Berlin under the Four 
Powers Agreement), so there is some precedent to British Airways’ involvement in the 
German domestic market.  Germany’s second-largest carrier, Air Berlin, serves many 
German airports and also hubs at Palma de Mallorca, Spain.  Should dba and Air Berlin 
merge, or should one or both be purchased by British Airways (or otherwise 
amalgamated into Oneworld), BBI would be a top prospect to be British Airways’ elusive 
continental hub.79  A possible harbinger of such a deal would be any investment by BAA 
during the privatization of FBS, since BAA owns London/Gatwick, the current secondary 
hub for British Airways, which would be negatively affected by such a play. 
There are signs that point to Oneworld’s grooming Budapest as its central 
European hub.  The Hungarian carrier Malev—even though SkyTeam’s Alitalia 
restructured it in the 1990s—is scheduled to join Oneworld in 2006.80  Malev hubs at 
Budapest Ferihegy Airport, which can handle the Boeing 747.  Ferihegy currently accepts 
nightflights pending a user fee, and is planning to build a new runway.81  BAA, which 
owns the British Airways hubs of Heathrow and Gatwick, purchased a majority share of 
Ferihegy in December 2005.82  Berlin and BBI seem more attractive than Budapest and 
Ferihegy, considering the imminent and publicly funded redevelopment, potential 
handling of the A-380, greater origin and destination travel from passengers, and 
proximity to the Western European “pentagon.”  However, without the freedom of 
                                                 
78 Berg, Mario, Lufthansa Cargo (personal communication 3 Mar 2006). 
79 Spain, while continental, is peripheral to the “pentagon,” where economic activity and affluent 
passengers are concentrated. 
80 Oneworld Alliance.  http://www.oneworld.com.  Last accessed 25 Mar 2006. 
81 Budapest-Ferihegy Airport. http://www.hungary-airport.hu.  Last accessed 25 Mar 2006. 
82 British Broadcasting Company.  “BAA closing in on Hungarian deal”  http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ 
business/4511168.stm.  Last accessed 25 Mar 2006. 
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nightflights, it seems unlikely that Oneworld and British Airways would utilize BBI as a 
continental hub. 
 
3.4 Low-cost carriers 
Some of the traits that made Schönefeld attractive to LCCs will not exist at BBI.  
There are different network models for LCCs, but they all have the same business model: 
the minimization of costs.  Typically, this results in their servicing under-utilized—and 
thus cheaper—airports in major cities or vacation destinations.  While Berlin is yet to 
attain the status of vacation destination, it is still a major city, with nearly ten million 
persons within its catchment area. 
From the consumer’s perspective, perhaps the most significant result of 
deregulation has been the increased affordability of flight, best exemplified by the 
phenomenal proliferation of LCCs.  They vary widely, but their business model has a few 
typical features: flying to secondary airports with minimal landing fees; booking e-tickets 
directly with customers over the Internet; having no frills on board the aircraft; owning a 
standardized aircraft fleet; and, avoiding the logistical requirements of hubbing.83  This 
business model was first successfully executed by Southwest Airlines in the US, who by 
the 1990s had inspired Irish and British mimics, namely Ryanair and EasyJet.  Also, 
many charter services became LCCs by formalizing their routes, linking numerous 
Mediterranean holiday destinations with one or two northern European cities.  (This 
north-south axis of European LCCs very recently has been complemented by some east-
west routes, linking large Eastern European cities with Western holiday destinations and 
business centers.)  Some successful LCCs, such as EasyJet and Air Berlin, are large 
                                                 
83 Garriga 2004. 
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enough to realize the benefits of hubbing—thus straying away from the original business 
model.  Today there are at least 50 European LCCs, putting tremendous pressure on 
regional air carriers to cut costs and differentiate service.84
Over the past few years Schönefeld has experienced a boom in LCC flights.85  
Data are not readily available on how many of an airport’s passengers fly on a LCC, 
chiefly because the definition of LCC is mutable.  However, one can assert that a major 
share of Schönefeld’s increase in passengers is due to LCCs.  One of the LCC market 
leaders, EasyJet, made Schönefeld its central European hub in 2003, and accounted for 
one million enplaned passengers after just eight months of service.86  Also, the second- 
and third-leading airlines in Germany, Air Berlin and dba, respectively, and operate 
generally on the low-cost model. 
The airport proudly touts this LCC trend as a forecast of future demand, as part of 
the impetus for increasing airside capacity.  However, if forecasts of 20 to 30 million 
passengers are realized, the demand on the limited supply of slots at BBI surely will 
increase their price.  Moreover, BBI will have no secondary airport with which to 
compete for Berlin air service, so it will have, in effect, a local monopoly on commercial 
flight.  This lack of competition easily could drive up BBI’s landing fees, since airlines 
will have no alternative Berlin airport to serve.  EasyJet’s lone statement on BBI is that it 
wants the new airport to preserve LCC service in its business model, but it is quite 
possible that LCCs could be priced out of the Berlin market.87  From the airport’s 
perspective, this would be a good problem to have, because it would mean that BBI 
                                                 
84 Skyscanner. http://www.skyscanner.net.  Last accessed 7 Apr 2006. 
85 FBS.  2004.  Airport.  Autumn edition of a quarterly newspaper. 
86 FBS.  2006.  Check-in: Facts and figures. 
87 Aust, O., EasyJet (personal communication 6 Feb 2006). 
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became popular for major air carriers.  From the passenger’s perspective, however, there 
would be a substantial low-cost market that would go untapped. 
Two “German” LCCs were established in the US and the UK before the 
termination of the Four Powers Agreement in 1990, thus allowing them to serve West 
Berlin.  Presently they are now the second and third most-traveled German carriers: Air 
Berlin and dba, respectively.  Each recently has consolidated its position, and they market 
themselves as rivals to Lufthansa and not as “low-cost.”  In February 2006 dba purchased 
LTU, a well-known German charter airline.88  This could be seen as a response to Air 
Berlin’s “inheritance” of the fleet of Germania—another popular charter—following the 
death of its owner in November 2005.89  Impressively, Air Berlin has cabotage freedom 
in Spain, and uses Palma de Mallorca as a hub.  In March 2006, Air Berlin made its 
initial public offering, in hopes that being publicly traded will help finance its future 
expansion.90
3g:  EasyJet leads the LCC boom at Schönefeld 
 
Source:  FBS, Check-in 
BBI will have no home carrier, unless one counts Air Berlin, a leading LCC.  
Since airlines and not airports choose the hubs, an airport should not invest in more 
capacity for the sake of LCCs, chiefly because LCCs and their passengers contribute 
                                                 
88 Tagesshau website. “dba kauft Mehrheit von LTU.” 17 Feb 2006. http://www.tagesschau.de/aktuell/ 
meldungen/0,1185,OID5247058_REF1,00.html 
89 Flottau, J. 2005.  “On the Move.” Aviation Week & Space Technology 163.20. 
90 Air Berlin press release. 8 Mar 2006. http://www.airberlin.com/site/index.php?LANG=eng. 
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little, relative to a hubbing home carrier or affluent business passengers, to an airport’s 
revenues.  An LCC such as Air Berlin hubs for purposes of personnel concentration, not 
for purposes of connecting passengers from one flight to the next.  For example, LCCs 
pay minimal (if any) landing fees, and their passengers rarely catch connecting flights 
(thus minimizing their “dwell time” to shop).91  Also, if ticket price was more important 
than, say, comfort or time cost, such price-sensitive passengers would seem less likely to 
spend money in the terminal, even if they did have much dwell time.  Thus, LCC hubbing 
barely involves either the aeronautical or the non-aeronautical benefits normally 
concomitant with a transfer hub.  BBI would not realize the benefits typical of a transfer 
hub, despite Air Berlin’s presence. 
Eastern European LCCs come and go so rapidly that it is difficult to take a 
snapshot without it coming out blurry.  However, one can make an accurate 
generalization: Eastern European LCCs do not fly to Berlin.  The Czech LCC, 
Smartwings, links Prague to western hubs and tourist destinations beyond a day’s drive or 
train ride, and Berlin may be just too close.92  Wizzair connects Budapest, Warsaw, 
Katowice, and Gdansk to secondary airports of major cities across Western Europe—but 
not to Schönefeld.93  Centralwings, owned by LOT, connects many Polish cities with 
tourist destinations, the British Isles, and some other western cities.94  Its only German 
connection is Cologne-Bonn, but, like Smartwings, perhaps it is just to close to Berlin to 
merit flights.  Out of Bucharest, Blue Air serves a hodgepodge of mostly secondary 
                                                 
91 Doganis (1992) wrote that in Europe in 1989, concessions from terminal merchants composed 16% of 
total airport revenue.  This was the largest slice of non-aeronautical revenue, and third overall, behind 
landing fees (21%) and passenger fees (20%). 
92 Smartwings website. http://www.smartwings.net/en/. Last accessed 11 Apr 2006. 
93 Wizzair website. http://wizzair.com/index.shtml. Last accessed 11 Apr 2006. 
94 Centralwings website. http://www8.centralwings.com/. Last accessed 11 Apr 2006. 
 49
airports, with the only German destination being Frankfurt/Hahn.95  The Bulgarian LCC, 
Hemus, links Sofia to Hannover and Cologne-Bonn, but not Berlin.96
Perhaps the largest LCC in Eastern Europe, SkyEurope, had a flight to Berlin and 
dropped it.97  Slovakia’s capital and one of SkyEurope’s bases, Bratislava positions itself 
as the LCC option for Vienna, reinforcing the notion that the market does not support 
LCC service from Eastern Europe to Berlin.  Typically, a flight from Berlin to Vienna via 
LCC would go from secondary airport to secondary airport, viz Schönefeld to Bratislava.  
However, the LCC option between the Berlin market and the Vienna market is Air 
Berlin, which links Tegel with Vienna International—showing that the LCC market for 
Berlin looks West, even to the Kingdom of the East.98
 Despite the recent LCC attention given to Schönefeld, Tegel is not without LCC 
service.  Approximately ten LCCs serve each airport.  While Air Berlin serves both, the 
other German LCCs serve one of Berlin’s airports exclusively.99  Flying on a LCC, a 
passenger can reach around 50 destinations from Tegel, and about 60 from Schönefeld.100
 
3.5 Freight 
Reiterating the conclusion of Schulte in 2002, it is unlikely that BBI will be an air 
freight hub.  BBI’s prospect as a freight hub seems even less likely today than in 2002, 
due to the maturation of the plans for BBI and the emergence of Leipzig as an air freight 
                                                 
95 Blue Air website. http://www.blueair-web.com/index.php?location=destinations&LANG=EN. Last 
accessed 11 Apr 2006. 
96 Hemus Air website. http://www.hemusair.bg/low_cost/en/index.php. Last accessed 11 Apr 2006. 
97 Garriga 2004; and SkyEurope website. www.skyeurope.com/en/. Last accessed 11 Apr 2006. 




hub.  However, there remain some exploitable features to both the airport and the region 
that offer some hope. 
FBS’s current plans for BBI focus decidedly on passenger service.  While this 
could be because the populace more readily appreciates the experience of commercial 
flight than the “invisible hand” of air freight, the emphasis thus far is one-sided.  One 
basic reason why air freight is not a major concern for FBS is that the regional economy 
is struggling, or at best stagnant.  While BBI will serve a large city, Berlin does not 
“make things.”  Berlin manufacturers would not generate very much air freight, since 
after reunification that sector was eviscerated throughout the former East Germany.  
Meanwhile, the Berlin government has much of its capital budget tied up in major 
infrastructure projects, with little remainder to dedicate towards other efforts for 
economic development. 
 For its freight prospects, FBS touts Berlin’s role as a political capital and as 
(allegedly) an important commercial center.101  Also marketable is the city’s central 
geographic position on the continent as well as the excellent transportation infrastructure 
in Germany.  It also promotes Berlin as a node in both air cargo and trucking networks in 
Europe.  Some of these characterizations are rather optimistic, and, considering the 
dominance of Frankfurt/Main in air cargo in Germany, rather misleading. 
 Berlin was the first German city to be served by all four major freight integrators: 
FedEx, UPS, DHL, and TNT.102  FedEx flies daily from its Paris hub to Tempelhof.  UPS 
flies daily from its Cologne-Bonn hub to Schönefeld.  DHL, when it was based in 
Brussels, used Berlin as its stopover between its hub and the Polish cities of Gdansk, 
                                                 
101 FBS. 2006. http://www.berlin-airport.de/PubEnglish/PubSchönefeld/PubCargoSXF/ 
PubUntern_der_RegionSXF/index.html. Last accessed 7 Apr 2006. 
102 Flughafen Berlin Schönefeld.  2005.  Frachthandout.  Unpublished presentation. 
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Warsaw, and Katowice.  (This is unlikely to persist once Leipzig’s hub is realized.)  
Finally, TNT connects Warsaw and its Liege hub with Tegel. 
Currently, cargo travels to and from Schönefeld and Tegel in different ways.  
Schönefeld allows nightflights and has a rail link, so it receives approximately two-thirds 
of dedicated freighter traffic to Berlin.103  While the current tripartite airport system 
allows Schönefeld to function as the freighter specialist (relatively speaking), it is 
possible that air cargo to BBI would drop significantly, relative to the sum presently 
handled by Schönefeld, Tegel, and Tempelhof combined.  Hence, an unsettled, 
unprecedented matter will be the effect of the consolidation of Berlin’s airports on the 
balance of freight and passenger service.  The future dynamic at BBI between cargo 
borne by airlines and cargo brought by dedicated freighters may be more complicated 
than a simple matter of addition; should slot space rise in demand, the airport may have 
to choose one over the other.  Today it appears that FBS would prioritize passenger 
airlines. 
Given the status of Berlin in the context of the continental European air freight 
system, its freight activity is negligible.  Frankfurt/Main dwarfs other German airports—
and other European airports, for that matter—when it comes to freight, due to the long-
haul flights with wide-body aircraft that frequent the airport.  Since Frankfurt is within a 
day’s truck of Berlin, there is no reasonable chance for Berlin to be a freight hub of any 
consequence, if such freight comes from air carriers.  For example, 30% of the freight 
moved by Lufthansa Cargo at Tegel connects with Frankfurt via truck.104  The bulk of the 
remaining 70% flies to Frankfurt, as the Frankfurt/Main-Berlin/Tegel shuttle is the only 
                                                 
103 Flughafen Berlin Schönefeld.  2005.  Check-in; and Flughafen Berlin Schönefeld.  2004. Check-in. 
104 Berg, M., Lufthansa Cargo (personal communication 3 Mar 2006). 
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flight for which Lufthansa uses a wide-body aircraft, the A-300.105  In addition, Air 
Berlin has used available bellyspace for cargo since June 2005.106   
Frankfurt/Main is a massive transfer hub with very many long-haul connections, 
and Munich’s airport is growing up to resemble her bigger sister in the Lufthansa family.  
Both are within one day’s truck of Berlin, as is Amsterdam Schiphol. ((FN: freight 
catchment is a day’s truck, or a 500-600 km radius.))   Also, most of the European hubs 
of dedicated freighters are with a day’s truck from Berlin: UPS is in Cologne-Bonn, TNT 
in Liege, Cargolux in Luxembourg, and DHL in Brussels.  Also, DHL will move its hub  
3h: The top European freight hubs 
 
to Leipzig by the end of 2006.  DHL is in fact a subsidiary of Deutsche Post, so air mail 
to Berlin doubtlessly will be diverted to Leipzig, thus further reducing BBI’s freight 
                                                 
105 ibid. 
106 FBS. 2005. http://www.berlin-airport.de/PubEnglish/PubSchönefeld/PubCargoSXF/PubCargoNews/ 
index.html. Last accessed 7 Apr 2006. 
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loads.  Considering the tonnage going to airports within Berlin’s freight catchment, it is 
highly improbable that their Berlin-bound cargo would actually be unloaded from a plane 
in Berlin. 
The emergence of Flughafen Frankfurt/Hahn as a complement to Frankfurt/Main 
is both a good example of a secondary airport and an interesting analogy to the dynamic 
between Schönefeld and Tegel.  The ADV have reported Hahn’s data only since 2004, 
and already the airport is the eleventh largest in Germany, essentially through its position 
as the low-cost option for the Frankfurt area.  Furthermore, Hahn has attracted service 
from dedicated freighters, giving it over 100,000 tons handled in 2005 (half as much as 
Munich, and fourth among German airports).107  On a much smaller scale, 
Berlin/Schönefeld and Berlin/Tegel mimic the relationship between Frankfurt/Hahn and 
Frankfurt/Main.  From the Frankfurt case, one can see that a multiplicity of airports—an 
airport system—can be a win/win scenario; indeed, both airports are owned by the same 
company, Fraport AG.  However, the consolidation of commercial aviation at BBI would 
deny Berlin a secondary airport, and the differentiation in focus and service that an 
airport system allows.  Passengers ultimately benefit from a differentiation in service or, 
conversely, ultimately suffer from its homogeny. 
The two charts on the following page show thousands of tons of air cargo handled 
at large German airports.  If the two charts were combined, one would not be able to 
distinguish the various lines at the bottom.  Frankfurt/Main’s dominant position is quite 
clear.  Despite Munich’s emergence as Lufthansa’s secondary hub, its freight levels are 
                                                 
107 ADV.  2006.  Kumulierte Monatswerte.  http://www.adv-net.org/download/presse/.  Last accessed 7 Apr 
2006. 
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still dwarfed by those of a freight hub, Cologne-Bonn.  The charts also show how non-
hubs hardly matter in the world of air cargo. 
3i: 
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There is some good news for air freight at BBI.  There is no foreseeable shortage 
of airside capacity.  Berlin lies (slightly) closer to East Asia than many other European 
cities—certainly closer than most continental cities with excellent transportation 
infrastructure.  FBS claimed that 45% of air cargo in Berlin in 2004 flew to or from Asia, 
but the author could not locate the source of this figure; indeed the discovered data paint 
a different picture.108  Regardless, Berlin’s location means that flights with Asia need not 
navigate the air traffic above the western European “pentagon.”  Had nightflights been 
allowed, there would have been even more good news. 
Berlin is beyond the catchment of only one freight hub, FedEx in Paris/Charles de 
Gaulle.  However, Paris/Charles de Gaulle is a busy airport and with constrained airside 
capacity, so FedEx may look elsewhere for its European hub.  It is not without precedent 
for FedEx to move hubs; it did so in Southeast Asia in 2005, going from Subic Bay 
(Philippines) to Guangzhou (China).  There is also precedent for a freighter to move its 
European hub, as DHL is set to move from Brussels to Leipzig in 2006.  Might FedEx 
locate a hub at BBI?  This certainly would be only way for Berlin to have significant 
freight service—and with FedEx it would have very much indeed.  First, freight hubs 
must be within a day’s truck from the Western European “pentagon,” which Berlin is (viz 
Leipzig).  Second, the up-and-coming routes in global air freight are to and from East and 
Southeast Asia, to which Berlin is approximately 1,000km closer than Paris.  A European 
airport further east likely would be too far from the “pentagon,” and would lack 
Germany’s superb transportation infrastructure.  An airport further west might not have 
nightflights, given the population density of the “pentagon.”  Berlin’s only bet for freight 
                                                 
108 FBS 2005 Frachthandout; and Eurostat "avia_goexac” dataset for 2004: “International extra-EU freight 
and mail air transport by main airports in each reporting country and partner world regions and countries”. 
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is FedEx, and it is a good bet.  If BBI becomes a FedEx hub, the economic impact of the 
airport could be great, following the effects of FedEx on Memphis, Indianapolis, and 
(potentially) Greensboro. 
Finally, BBI could be a freight hub linked to Dubai.  While this point is 
speculative and tenuous, as it is dependent on both Emirates and British Airways, it is 
worth mentioning.  Emirates is an emerging air carrier, and remains non-aligned with any 
airline alliance.  Based on its massive marketing endeavors in Britain, however, it seems 
keen on being a major carrier for London-to-Asia routes.  Hence, its hub of Dubai would 
increase its already-burgeoning significance.  The only London airports large enough for 
the necessary aircraft for intercontinental flight are Heathrow and Gatwick, British 
Airways’ two hubs.  In essence, securing a position at either of those airports (and 
Heathrow in particular) means coming to an understanding with British Airways, which 
controls a majority of the slots at each.109  There are additional reasons why it would be 
unsurprising for Emirates to team up with British Airways: English is the language of 
business in the UAE, and a UAE firm recently purchased P&O, a major British shipping 
concern (which dovetails nicely with Dubai airport’s being a fast-growing freight hub).  
Thus, from Emirates’ perspective, it might want a freight hub in both Britain and the 
continent.  Likewise, British Airways desires a centrally located hub on the continent for 
its Oneworld alliance.  If British Airways nabs dba or Air Berlin, and thus hubs at BBI, 




                                                 
109 Wikipedia. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_Airways. Last accessed 8 Apr 2006. 
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3.6 Conclusion of analysis 
A hub airport must have one of the following qualities: serving a global city 
(London, Paris, New York, Los Angeles), serving a city ideally situated politically and 
geographically (Singapore, Hong Kong, Miami, Dubai), or adopted as a base by a 
passenger or freight carrier (Frankfurt/Main, Charlotte, Memphis, Louisville).  With 
regard to the first quality, Berlin is not a global city.  Regarding the second, it is well-
positioned for the Europe-Asia freight route, as aircraft would not have to negotiate the 
air traffic above the Western European “pentagon.”  However, in this respect Berlin 
would be a latecomer to Leipzig, and their status could change in the (unlikely) event that 
Eastern Europe’s transportation infrastructure rises to Germany’s level.  Finally, 
pertaining to the third potential quality of a hub, BBI will be the base of Air Berlin—but 
not even a secondary hub for Lufthansa.  If Lufthansa continues its disinterest in Berlin, 












4. The Spatial-Economic Impact of BBI 
 
The redevelopment of Schönefeld into BBI is a major component of the 
reinvention of Berlin into a reunited, capital city.  It can be an example of architecture as 
public art, a work that stands as an impressive entrance for visitors—not unlike the 
Brandenburg Gate.  However, an airport’s development is not a discrete event; it affects 
many facets of planning, development, and urban economics.  It is a major multimodal 
transportation link for the greater region, annually handling millions of tons of freight and 
millions of passengers.  New roads get built, new businesses are attracted to (or priced 
out of) a region, and commuting and housing preferences change.  Berlin will get an 
airport befitting a major capital, but can the airport help give Berlin an economy befitting 
a thriving city? 
 
4.1 New Berlin, new Germany, new Europe 
The Cold War sealed Berlin’s post-Cold War fate, as the Allied powers had 
removed command and control functions of the German state(s) away from Berlin, to 
various cities in West Germany (or even to Washington and Moscow).  In addition, 
Germany is a polycentric country, with major population centers at the Rhine-Ruhr 
conurbation, Berlin, Hamburg, Munich, and Frankfurt.  Combined with a federal political 
system, one might expect such a country to have a scale-free, polycentric airport system.  
However, passengers and freight networks do not operate that way, due in large part to 
the hub-and-spoke model.  Frankfurt/Main then is the primate airport for the country of 
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Germany, due initially to the preferences of the US military, then to the emergence of the 
city as a financial center, and later to the growing strength of Lufthansa.   
In the years immediately following German Reunification, authorities were very 
optimistic towards the future of Berlin.  As a divided city, its two halves composed a 
metropolis of 3.5 million inhabitants.  With the relocation of the seat of government from 
Bonn and massive capital construction in former East Berlin, boosters imagined that the 
firms that had fled Berlin after the Second World War promptly would return.  The rosy 
estimate was a boomtown of 6 million people, but this growth has not yet occurred.110  
First, the “risk” bonus West Berliners had received ended, along with the subsidies that 
the West German government had offered firms located within the “island” city.111  
Second, the manufacturing sector of East Berlin and East Germany essentially collapsed, 
causing massive structural unemployment from which the region is yet to recover.  These 
great changes compelled many job-seekers to move away. 
 Germany’s polycentricity and the economic strength of its west make Berlin 
unlikely to benefit significantly from the ongoing economic integration of Europe.  
Within the context of central Europe, Berlin is one of the easternmost “Western” cities.  
It is closer to Poland and the Czech Republic than to the “pentagon” of the Western core: 
London-Paris-Milan-Munich-Hamburg.  One may be tempted to believe that Berlin is 
well positioned to benefit economically from the accession of former Eastern Bloc 
nations into the EU.  However, the strong capital and knowledge linkages flow to the 
East from the institutions and firms in western Germany.112  In a sense, eastern Germany 
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gets bypassed on the freeways from Poznan to Frankfurt-am-Main or from Warsaw to 
Düsseldorf.  Berlin may be a slight exception to this rule—particularly regarding 
German-Polish linkages—but it is the exception that proves the rule, showing that cross-
border development need not have a geographic parameter.113
Indeed, due to the polycentric structure of Berlin itself, airport consolidation—in 
concert with numerous other major infrastructure projects—should have a profound 
effect on the economic map of the city and region.  Major developments over the past 15 
years have concentrated most investment on an area that, on a map, vaguely resembles a 
mushroom.114  The mushroom’s cap would link the two downtowns of the divided  
             4a:  The “mushroom” of new Berlin development 
 
Source: GEOS Berlin 
Berlins, Zoo Station and Alexanderplatz, with improved east-west transportation, the 
construction of new embassies, and a concentration of the city’s cultural highlights.  As 
the base of the mushroom’s stem, BBI will strengthen the entire stalk.  For instance, its 
transportation connections will reinforce the North-South axis that approximately follows 
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the eastern portion of the Berlin Wall.  To this effect, the Gemeinsame 
Landesplanungsabteilung produced a transportation plan for BBI in October 2003.  A 
new highway will run up the Teltow Canal, which has the necessary width because the 
Berlin Wall used to run along it.  The U-bahn that now terminates in Rudow would 
extend to the terminal, but this project has been suspended.  A new express train will run 
from BBI north to Papestraße S-Bahn station, Potsdamer Platz, and terminating at 
Lehrterbahnhof.  The Papestraße station, which is on the S-Bahn Ring around the center-
city, will be renamed Südkreuz (southern intersection), indicating its elevated status.  
Likewise, later in 2006 Lehrterbahnhof will become the new Hauptbahnhof (main train 
station).  Also a massive infrastructure project, Lehrterbahnhof marks the top of the 
mushroom’s cap. 
 
Building an airport city 
An airport city is a coherent and dense urban form at and around an airport.  It 
exploits the airport’s nodal role in its regional transportation network to be an attractive 
place to work, shop, and even play.  It is a new downtown, yet it is in exurbia.  This 
downtown-like development, however, must be symbiotic with the current and future 
aviation needs of the airport.  If an airport city is to be sustainable beyond the short term, 
it must not interfere with flight patterns or potential expansion.  For its part, airport 
management must emphasize non-aeronautical, landside, commercial development.  
Likewise, the area jurisdictions must commit to regional planning, so the airport city is 
allowed to develop in a way that both fits with transportation infrastructure and permits 
future airport expansion. 
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Flight enthusiast H. McKinley Conway played Cassandra on the problem of 
unplanned airport development, and helped popularize the term “airport city” in his 1980 
book of the same name.  Such developmental coherence, according to Conway, requires 
the coordination of the systems of industry, airport management, and transportation—all 
under the purview, typically, of the political system.  With this prescribed cooperation, an 
airport could maximize its economic impact.  A successful airport city would combine 
functions (industrial parks and multimodal transit, e.g.) that tend to separate according to 
the fissures between the airside and landside of an airport, between the airport and its 
surroundings, or between different political jurisdictions.  This conflation would make 
the airport a more attractive place to use, do business, and, ultimately, to live.115
Around the same time, Richard de Neufville and Rigas Doganis warned that 
existing airports would not come close to having the capacity to match demand in the 
near future.  Existing airports the world over had been built to accommodate a regulated 
industry that changed according to supply (plane size, e.g.), but they contended that 
deregulation would engender an industry far more sensitive to passenger demand 
(cheaper tickets, e.g.).  Airports would have to be abandoned or expanded, they argued, at 
a rate that the public sector did not like to operate, particularly with popular opinion 
somewhat jaundiced on noise pollution and expensive projects.116  Since deregulation, 
worldwide passenger and cargo numbers have increased dramatically, thus spawning 
another generation of airports and proving de Neufville and Doganis correct. 
To help finance the redevelopment (and in rare cases new construction) of an 
airport, a government often will privatize its aviation assets in order to attract 
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investment.117  Airport privatization has many hybrids with public control, but its pure 
form was initiated in the UK, with the British Airports Authority (BAA).  BAA was 
founded in 1966 as a government entity, but was sold off in 1987 at L1.3 Billion.118  
Thanks in so small part to its operating the very profitable London/Heathrow, BAA has 
enjoyed success which encouraged other privatizations.  Today some firms, such as 
Fraport AG or the Schiphol Group, own and manage dozens of airports across the globe. 
Privatization has spurred the landside function of such airports to diversify and 
blossom, as the running of terminals became a business instead of a public service.  The 
best example of this is London/Heathrow, the biggest European airport.  It has the most 
expensive passenger fees in the world, along with the most expensive square footage of 
retail space in the UK.119  Yet it has no monopoly on flight to or from London; in fact, 
British Airways also hubs at London/Gatwick, and the two leading European low-cost 
carriers (LCCs) base at other London airports.  The activity and demand at Heathrow is in 
large part due to the quality of the airport, as both a good and a service. 
Airports reap most of their revenues from a variety of user-fees.  Some are 
aeronautical, such as the landing fee and passenger fees, while others are non-
aeronautical, drawing rents and concessions from firms located on the airport’s land.120  
Airlines, struggling from increased fuel cost combined with pressure to reduce costs due 
to LCCs and deregulation, increasingly will demand lower aeronautical fees from 
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airports.121  Airports then must recoup such revenue from non-aeronautical windfalls—
typically from an “airport city” development. 
A profit-seeking airport often will have many revenue streams that have little to 
do with aviation.  Intercontinental flights and hub connections allow for more passengers 
shopping at a terminal, particularly at its highly lucrative duty-free shops.122  More 
landside revenue often comes from developing the land around the airport in an attractive 
way, building an airport city.  In 2003 Mathis and Martin Güller colorfully analyzed nine 
European airport cities for the Airport Regions Conference.  They found that the issue is 
not whether, but how, the area between the airport and the center city will develop.  
Airport city planning does not stop at the airport’s perimeter, and its expansion is 
continual and necessary.  Targeted development encircling an airport can choke it from 
further expansion, given the need for noise contours and buffer zones, while a purely 
laissez-faire approach can produce spatial incoherence and traffic woes.  One of the keys 
to a successful airport city, then, is farsighted regional planning for both transportation 
and zoning.123  An airport city exploits its nodal role in regional transportation by 
thoroughly developing the real estate around its multimodal transfer station (often the 
terminal itself).  The terminal might have a hotel, convention center, and very attractive 
shopping—all of the amenities of the center city, but with a tarmac for Main Street. 
Perhaps Europe’s best example of an airport city is Amsterdam Schiphol.  The 
airport itself is owned and managed by The Schiphol Group, a publicly traded 
corporation.  The Schiphol Group wholly owns an entity called Schiphol Real Estate, 
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which manages property within the airport’s boundaries (approximately 250 hectares).124  
The Schiphol Group also has entered into a public-private partnership with the three 
jurisdictions involved with the airport: the city of Amsterdam, the municipality of 
Haarlemmermeer, and the province of Noord Holland.  This team owns the Schiphol 
Area Development Company, and manages the business parks and support facilities off 
the airport’s property (approximately 800 hectares).125  In addition, the four joint-owners 
of the Schiphol Area Development Company have teamed with other public and private 
entities in the region (including KLM Airlines) to form the Amsterdam Airport Area.  
This organization acts like a chamber of commerce, billing itself as a “one-stop shop” for 
firms interested in locating in Europe.126
Willem de Trommels, former director of the Schiphol Area Development 
Company, cites four prerequisites to a successful airport city, like Amsterdam 
Schiphol.127  First, the airport should not be too far from the city it serves—being 
between cities works well (Rotterdam, The Hague and Amsterdam).  Second, the various 
political jurisdictions must read from the same page, sharing an appreciation of the 
importance of the airport to inter-jurisdictional economic development.  The third 
prerequisite is a structured planning approach, supplied with a combined comprehensive 
plan for both the airport and its surroundings, thus integrating the transportation 
infrastructure and landside development both on and off the airport’s territory.  Finally, 
de Trommels cites an active management focused on corporate organization, regional 
marketing, and a pre-emptive attitude towards land acquisition. 
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With hopes of maximizing the economic impact of BBI (and the windfall from 
this impact), in 2004 the New York-based Hudson Investment Group established the 
Berlin Area Development Company GmbH (BADC).  In 2005 it hired Willem de 
Trommels to be the BADC’s executive director.  The BADC’s efforts thus far have 
focused on forging a team of partners among FBS and the pertinent jurisdictions and 
landowners, in the hopes that a shared vision will facilitate coordinated development. 
As with Amsterdam Schiphol, multiple jurisdictions play significant roles any 
planning process involving the land in and around BBI.  While the Federal Government 
and the Länder of Berlin and Brandenburg are joint-owners of FBS, the land-use 
decisions around the airport are initiated by the municipality of Schönefeld, whose 
jurisdiction surrounds BBI and six nearby villages.  In addition, while FBS owns the 
airport’s 1,500 hectares, local farmers and land speculators from western Germany own 
the adjacent parcels, where BADC targets much development.  BADC and the 
municipality of Schönefeld are cooperating to update the town’s comprehensive plan to 
reflect targeted development.  The two areas BADC wants to focus on are by BBI’s 
entrance (to its east) and the area occupied by Schönefeld’s terminal and old runway (to 
BBI’s north).  However, BADC so far has received only lukewarm cooperation from 
FBS—cooperation vital to the coherent development of land both inside and outside the 
airport’s boundaries.128
The airport’s boundary is not the only border of note.  The political distinction 
and spatial difference between Berlin and Brandenburg make the success of a BBI airport 
city both a great challenge and great opportunity.  Generally, yet dramatically, Berlin has 
a far greater population density than does Brandenburg.  In the former West Berlin, the 
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communities of Rudow and Altglienicke are the closest urban forms to Schönefeld.  As 
their areas already are built up, it seems unlikely that business attracted to BBI would 
locate here; however, these towns would be well positioned as a place of residence for the 
thousands of employees who would work at or around BBI.  Doubtlessly this would 
strain Rudow’s and Altglienicke’s social services, school system, and transportation 
infrastructure; if they is prepared for the changes BBI will bring, these communities can 
exploit the situation to the benefit of their residents and administration.  In the former 
East Berlin, and to the immediate north of Rudow, is Adlershof, which now houses the 
science campus for Humboldt Universität zu Berlin.  Following the model investigated 
by Luger and Goldstein in Technology in the Garden, it would be sensible for HU, 
BADC, and FBS to discuss the formation of a research park.  This, of course, is easier 
said than done. 
Inter-jurisdictional problems may arise.  FBS is owned by three governments; it is 
run by politicians and bureaucrats, not businessmen.  Still, FBS will seek some return on 
“its” investment, BBI—particularly because it will not share in the spoils of developing 
Tempelhof and it cannot develop Tegel (which is owned by the German Air Force).  
Hence, the BBI’s land is the developable parcel—the airport city—that can produce 
revenues directly for FBS.  Development outside the airport’s boundaries—elsewhere, for 
example, in Gemeinde Schönefeld —seemingly would dilute the demand for space on-
site at BBI and thus reduce non-aeronautical revenues for FBS.  Although there seems to 
be a way around this, given that the pertinent government would collect taxes and fees 
from sites outside the airport, FBS has (at time of writing) refused offers to cooperate 
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with off-site developers.  FBS has an interest in not developing the land surrounding the 
airport, much of which would be a prime site for an airport city. 
4b: The area around Schönefeld and BBI (dense settlement in green) 
 
By obstructing development, FBS (and its governmental owners) are not merely 
dismissing the interests of eager developers and absentee land-speculators.  It also would 
be subverting the (future) land-use plan of Gemeinde Schönefeld.  The municipality has 
retained a professional planner to produce a new comprehensive plan.  It is a work in 
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progress, but the author has seen drafts.129  Presently it is unclear whether the 
Brandenburg government sees this as a problem, as the potential conflict—overruling a 
local land-use plan in hopes of maximizing airport revenues—is at least a year from 
being ripe. 
Competition amongst Berlin, Gemeinde Schönefeld, and Brandenburg, easily 
could produce incoherent development along the corridor between BBI and the center of 
Berlin.  A spatial mess could result, with nightmarish traffic and diminishing returns from 
an oversupply of industrial parks and office space.  On the other hand, development could 
be restricted essentially to BBI itself, making the airport an island of government-
orchestrated development.  However, creative leadership from politicians and FBS (akin 
to what de Trommels witnessed at Schiphol) could make BBI a new and educative case-
study of regional planning for an airport city. 
 
4.3. FBS’s own impact analysis 
 In 2005 professors at the Universität zu Köln produced for FBS an economic 
impact analysis of BBI.130  Their study projected employment, economic impact, 
multipliers, and tax revenue, for both the Federal Government and the region (Berlin and 
Brandenburg), out to 2012.  Its basis was 2004, with the three Berlin airports’ figures 
totaled.  The analysis considered one multi-year, major event (construction of BBI) along 
with ever-burgeoning operations of Tegel and Schönefeld. 
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 Some of the analysis’s assumptions are flawed.  It projects an annual increase of 
500 direct hires at Berlin airports through 2012.131  With the imminent closure of 
Tempelhof, thus eliminating some redundancy in operational staff, this projection seems 
impossible.  This would be the case again in 2011 once Tegel closes.  This is, in a sense, 
a merger, not a spin-off.  Also, while construction directly will hire very many persons, 
these jobs will not last the entire seven years (or so) of BBI’s development.  Furthermore, 
as airlines and airports increasingly cut costs, with labor as one of their greatest cost 
centers, it seems unlikely that direct airport employment would steadily grow.  Indeed, 
the meter of growth is based on passenger levels (1000 direct jobs per 1,000,000 annual 
passengers), which is a convenient, base-ten measuring stick that will be decreasingly 
precise in the twenty-first century. 
 The Köln analysis gives the Berlin-Brandenburg region the comps of Frankfurt, 
Munich, Paris, Amsterdam, and London.132  This is hopeful if not misleading.  Berlin is 
not a global city or even a financial capital; its economy is stagnant.  Moreover, not only 
are the metropolitan regions quite different, but so might be the “airport city” 
developments (spurred in part by air cargo, of which Berlin has little).  For example, the 
regional multiplier of Berlin’s airports in 2004 was 0.9, and for 2012 it is projected to be 
0.7.133  Meanwhile, Hakfoort, et al., determined Amsterdam Schiphol to have had a 
regional multiplier of 2.0, from 1987-98.134
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 Finally, the Köln analysis adds two extra layers to the impacts of an airport.  
Beyond the traditional analysis of direct, indirect, and induced economic impacts, there is 
an additional boost to regional purchasing power due to increased airline traffic.135  
Ostensibly this would be the effect of more and more passengers (from outside the 
region) using Berlin airports and spending money in the local economy.  The 
employment increase from this extra layer is projected to surpass the combined effect of 
direct, indirect, and induced spending.  There is no sensitivity analysis to account, for 
example, for severe capacity constraints at Tegel or an end to the LCC boom at 
Schönefeld.  Furthermore, the Köln analysis projects additional jobs and income from 
firm relocation and new markets.136  While such events are bound to occur over the next 
seven years, projections of 32,400 new jobs and over €1 billion in income from firm 
relocation and new markets seem rather unsubstantiated.  The use of London and 
Frankfurt as comps for Berlin thus gives false hope. 
 In short, its false assumptions, inappropriate comparisons, and imaginary events 
make FBS’s economic impact analysis unbelievable. 
 
4.4. Scenarios 
Ten years have passed since the idea of building BBI first crystallized.  Less than 
a month has passed since the Bundesverwaltungsgericht—Germany’s supreme court—
gave BBI the green light.  Its approval came with a series of caveats, only one of which 
was made public on the day of its decision: nightflights are forbidden.  This ban 
dramatically changes what BBI can and will become, and could even jeopardize its 
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financial viability.  The Gericht will release more conditions by April 2006, so the 
situation is still a bit fluid.  However, the project did receive a thumbs-up, so it is 
worthwhile to forecast what that project might look like. 
4.4.i. Best-case scenario 
If nightflights had been permitted, BBI and its airport city could have become a 
driver of the regional economy; this scenario assumes nightflights are allowed, making 
the airport attractive to both air carriers and freighters.  To maximize the economic 
impact of BBI, FBS and area jurisdictions should turn their attention towards the landside 
development both in and around the airport.  The site of the old Flughafen Schönefeld 
terminal would become a dedicated freight terminal for FedEx, having been convinced to 
leave its crowded Paris hub.  The former parking lots and area surrounding the present S-
bahn terminus would be an industrial park for firms that heavily utilize air cargo.  The 
land surrounding the road ingress to the BBI terminal would become an office park, 
complete with hotels and workforce housing.  Land between Adlershof and BBI would be 
zoned for future development, while one contiguous area would be targeted for 
immediate development.  This could be Flugplatz Johannistal, just north of Humboldt 
Universität’s science and business campus, which would provide the land for a high-tech 
research park that would bring together the worlds of higher education and business.  
Since these aforementioned parks would be in Berlin and Brandenburg, these two Länder 
would work together on regional planning and to create a public-private partnership, like 
the Schiphol Area Development Company, to manage the real estate and equitably 
distribute the windfall. 
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Regarding airside development, BBI should promote itself to the Oneworld and 
SkyTeam alliances as an airline-friendly hub serving the largest city in central Europe.  
The terminal should double as a regional multimodal transportation node.  Its interior 
design should be modular or mutable enough to accommodate the vicissitudes of the 
modern airport—be it the desires of an airline alliance, the changing tastes in terminal 
retail, or the necessity of future expansion. 
4.4.ii. Most likely scenario 
The Gericht ruling to ban nightflights at BBI dramatically lowers the ceiling of 
the airport’s economic impact.  Certainly no dedicated freight service now will occur at 
BBI.  A major air carrier—perhaps from one of the airline alliances—would be loath to 
hub at an airport without nightflights over another airport with them.  Indeed, Air Berlin 
has threatened to leave the city after which it was named.137
The Länder of Berlin and Brandenburg want to focus development inside BBI’s 
boundaries—using their regional planning commission to block both local interests and 
market forces.  Nevertheless, Gemeinde Schönefeld is revising its comprehensive plan to 
accommodate the development forces concomitant with a new international airport.  The 
effort to develop an airport city is being led by the private sector, and has met a public 
sector wary of taking risks and disinterested in cooperation.  Also, Humboldt Universität 
is also not involved with landside development—research park or otherwise—even 
though the airport is just 6km from its Adlershof campus. 
Some aspects of the likely scenario are positive.  BBI will be a major node in the 
regional transportation infrastructure, particularly with an inter-city train station 
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incorporated in the terminal.  The air-rail link with Lehrterbahnhof will make check-in 
convenient in a part of the city that otherwise would be inconvenienced by the closure of 
Tegel.  In addition, the new autobahn connections will improve both regional 
accessibility and the value of adjacent land. 
The lack of nightflights could create a problem in BBI’s financing as well as 
FBS’s ultimate privatization scheme.  FBS wants to secure over €1 Billion in debt for the 
construction of BBI, but its ability to pay back the bank(s) could be hampered by 
unexploited non-aeronautical revenues.  A lender would see this risk and demand a 
higher return—one that FBS may struggle to match.  Of greater gravity is FBS’s 2011 
privatization.  The value of the airport suffers from a deflated demand for landside 
development, due in large part to the lack of nightflights.  In short, the government 
owners of FBS may not get a high offer for their product.  This likely could delay 
privatization by some years, with the governments holding out until they got a suitable 
offer. 
4.4.iii. The status quo 
“What if they don’t build it?”  This question was asked about the maglev train 
between Berlin and Hamburg, and remarkably authorities scrapped that mega-project.138  
Given the price tag and the ban on nightflights, it is useful to wonder what might happen 
should FBS choose not to build BBI. 
First, there seems to be consensus that Tempelhof must close.  It is completely 
surrounded by residential development; if it were truly a safety hazard it already would 
have been closed, but it is a perceived safety hazard.  Also, the highest and best use of its 
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land is not a rarely-used airfield—Berlin had zoned it for development as early as 
1998.139
Schönefeld currently has nightflights, and the status quo would preserve that.  It 
could still attract dedicated freighter service, but FedEx hub would be unlikely, as such a 
project probably would require an official approval process, and meet the same 
opposition and, perhaps, the same ban.  Schönefeld’s airside capacity is approximately 11 
million passengers a year,140 but in 2005 it served only 5 million,141 so it could continue 
to grow as Berlin’s secondary airport, attractive to LCCs. 
Tegel, on the other hand, is suffering capacity constraints.  Its status quo is 
untenable.  Tegel’s hexagonal terminal could get overhauled to make it more conducive 
to contemporary airline needs and passenger expectations.  Such a redevelopment could 
build up the closest of the adjacent parking lots, particularly if it adds a connection to the 
S-bahn or U-bahn.  However, FBS’s reluctance to pour money into a nearly obsolete 
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5. Planning, process, and protest 
A decade-long, €2 Billion infrastructure project is too important to get wrong, yet 
too prominent to get right.  That is to say, costs and impacts are too great to escape 
opposition, legitimate or contrarian.  An airport’s development is so time consuming as to 
outlast the administration that initiated it.  Furthermore, whatever interests spawn an 
airport’s development may purport a vision far beyond the next election cycle that many 
politicians are too myopic to see.  Hence, the planning process can be quite influential in 
airport development, as it can provide a roadmap (and even directions) for navigating 
such a long and important trek—even though the adventurers may come and go. 
 
5.1. The case against airports 
Opposition to airports will occur.  Airport planners, developers, and proponents 
would be wise to adopt a strategy that tries to minimize and redress opposition, not defeat 
it.  In western society, such opposition tends to seek justice in the court system, but it also 
has engaged in open protest.  Because the chief airport proponent often is the state, 
opponents often feel that recourse through the political process is either impossible or too 
slow.142
Airport opponents gain their most traction on environmental issues, namely the 
negative impacts of noise pollution.  Aircraft noise is an unavoidable aspect of the jet 
age, and hence an unavoidable component of airport planning.  Indeed, noise is a major 
reason why airports locate at the urban fringe or beyond, where fewer residents can 
generate less political opposition.  Noise is an inconvenience, to be sure, but it also 
reduces property values.  A recent study on the impact of aircraft noise on rents in 
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Geneva, Switzerland, showed that noise reduces rents about one percent per decibel.143  
Modern airport planning requires government approval of not only the airport’s land 
development, but also the “noise contours” above and around the greater area.  An 
airport’s neighbors are particularly sensitive to (and aware of) noise pollution at night, 
when most persons are at home, trying to sleep, and there is little background noise to 
cloak the jets’ roar.144  Owners of property within certain bounds of the noise contours 
have an appreciable grievance with the airport or government: the impact of decibel 
levels on the desirability and value of their land.  And the airport or government is likely 
to have the means to monetarily compensate such grievances.   
Another environmental issue common to airport development is water pollution.  
Runways, taxiways, aprons, hangars, terminals, et cetera, constitute a great deal of 
impermeable surface, resulting in massive runoffs during rainstorms.  This issue is 
complicated by the quotidian spills from the operation and maintenance of aircraft and 
heavy machinery.  The result is a potential for contaminated water in nearby or 
downstream areas. 
Airport redevelopment that involves expansion (building a new runway, for 
example) usually requires a great deal of land acquisition.  Runways and taxiways require 
a lot of space, yet even more acreage is affected by safety ordinances against structures 
on land radiating from the ends of runways—often extending beyond the airport’s 
property.  The amount of land involved is so vast that someone is bound to be negatively 
affected.  Exurban airports gobble up farms, while airports closer to urban areas affect 
more persons and more valuable land.  Sometimes expansion eradicates an entire 
                                                 
143 Baranzini, A., and Ramirez, J.  2005.  “Paying for quietness: The impact of noise on Geneva rents.” In 
Urban Studies, 42(4). 
144 ibid.; Baranzini and Ramirez confirm this, in the “annoyance” test. 
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settlement.  In so doing, governments tend to invoke some form of eminent domain, 
which can invite a property-rights backlash. 
Anti-airport protest can have undertones of a rejection of current patterns of 
economic development, as though an airport were a threat to a certain way of life.145  An 
airport can take on a symbolic role.  It can embody the power of the state, the economic 
and (foreign) political forces of globalization, the despoliation of nature, or simply 
change in general.  Such an anti-airport gestalt can prove quite powerful in melding 
different oppositional camps together.146
Airport protest in Germany is not without precedent.  When Frankfurt/Main 
expanded in the early 1970s, its detractors began as a disparate mixture, yet they 
coalesced into a strong political opposition.  One major strain was the typical anti-
development concern for the environmental impact—in Frankfurt’s case, the felling of 
trees in an otherwise-protected forest.147  Another feature was opposition to the US war 
in Vietnam, since bases in Germany were expanded or altered to accommodate the needs 
of the US military so it could project its sometimes-unpopular force overseas.148  Also, 
some citizens were alarmed at the scale of the development; many were skeptical as to 
how an expansive airport would benefit the city and region.149  To them, the airport 
simply was not worth the bother or investment.  These voices formed a chorus when a 
regional plebiscite on the airport’s future was stymied by the Federal Government, which 
claimed primacy.150
                                                 
145 Peattie 1992. 
146 ibid. 
147 ibid. 
148 Flughafen Frankfurt/Main was built on the site of the Rhein-Main US Air Force base. 
149 Freund, B., Humboldt Universität (personal communication 31 Jan 2006). 
150 Peattie 1992. 
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The airport of course was built, but its political residue remains, as the Green 
Party won election in that area in 1982—its first Bundestag representation.151  Airport 
regulations have become more stringent since then, and airport protests in Germany 
essentially have moved from the airport site to the court room.152
The work of airport planners will be met with opposition.  Planners then should 
approach their work with the general goal of managing a process as seemingly 
transparent and participatory as possible.  When the time comes to decide a final 
settlement, no stakeholders should feel surprised, ignored, or insulted.  Cautious 
anticipation of resistance is a vital skill for an airport planner.  Regarding BBI, planners 
did some things well and some things poorly. 
 
5.2. Planning BBI 
The history of planning Berlin’s new airport is a braid of several threads.  One is 
the airport’s authority producing a plan for BBI.  Another is the regional planning 
endeavor of the Länder of Berlin and Brandenburg.  Yet another is the local land-use 
decisions by the municipality of Schönefeld.  The final facet is the plan’s approval 
process with the Planfestellungsbehörde of the state of Brandenburg.  Although all of 
these threads concern various offices of, fundamentally, the same governments and 
constituencies, difficulties have emerged from a planning process that is decidedly top-
down and occasionally at crossed purposes. 
FBS consolidated its marketing and ownership in 1996, and began a plan to 
consolidate aviation at one airport.  The first decision was site selection.  It chose to 
                                                 
151 Rabbe, R., BADC (personal communication 27 Mar 2006). 
152 Kerber, M., Flughafen Berlin Schönefeld (personal communication 3 Apr 2006). 
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redevelop an existing airport, Schönefeld, as opposed to build from scratch on a 
greenfield site.  Details such as terminal design were not dealt with at this early stage; the 
major issues were runway and terminal location.  FBS accumulated the necessary land 
and, in November 1998, projected decibel levels (at one meter’s height) for what BBI 
flights might produce at 30 million passengers per year (estimated at 360,000 annual 
flights).  The official projection for daytime noise levels is the mean projection, while for 
nighttime it is the loudest.  FBS officially submitted its plan for BBI to Land 
Brandenburg’s Planfestellungsbehörde on 17 Dec 1999. 
Meanwhile, Berlin and Brandenburg failed to pass a referendum in 1996 on 
political unification.153  One response to this was to form a regional planning body for 
Berlin and Brandenburg, the Gemeinsame Landesplanungsabteilung.  In October 1994 it 
produced a comprehensive plan for the development of the suburban areas of Berlin, in 
Brandenburg.  In February 1998 it updated this plan, but still zoned most of the land—all 
save about 50 hectares around the village of Schönefeld—around the airport to stay rural.  
This was, of course, before the FBS had finalized its plan for BBI.  Nevertheless, these 
laws are still on the books, so the would-be “development zones” for an airport city 
around Schönefeld presently must retain their rural character.  Now, with a large airport 
in the works, this plan must be updated, and the Gemeinsame Landesplanungsabteilung 
hopes to do so in 2007. 
Following German Reunification, in 1991 the town of Schönefeld produced its 
first comprehensive plan.  At such an early date, this plan did not anticipate airport 
expansion—even though land speculation in the area had already begun.  In 2001, 
                                                 
153 Gemeinsame Landesplanung Berlin-Brandenburg. 1998. Joint planning for Berlin and Brandenburg. 
Potsdam: Ministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz und Raumordnung. 
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Gemeinde Schönefeld was formed, incorporating two erstwhile, smaller municipalities.  
Hence, its 15-year-old comprehensive plan only covers about one half of the 
municipality.  It currently is working on a new comprehensive plan that accommodates 
development concomitant to a large airport.  The original design of developing 1000 
hectares has been scaled back to around 600 hectares, in hopes of making it more 
palatable to higher offices.  The Gemeinde hopes to finish in 2006, with the goal of its 
being incorporated in the greater, Länder plan the following year. 
After FBS submitted its plan, concerned citizens had time to individually contact 
the Brandenburg Planfestellungsbehörde to register their opinions.  In May 2000, FBS 
and the Behörde widely disseminated the plan to the area villages, and gave residents 
four weeks to register their complaints.  Over the following month, 67,000 persons made 
163,000 comments.  In 2001 there were public hearings on the redevelopment plan, but 
they were held in Berlin and not Brandenburg, ostensibly for the reason that only Berlin 
had a convention facility large enough to handle the anticipated crowds.154  While 
technically Flughafen Schönefeld is also in Berlin, this site selection offended many in 
the communities that neighbor the airport, and helped amalgamate the opposition.155
The overriding issue to many concerned citizens was noise pollution.  The Federal 
Government has laws on appropriate noise levels.  Decibels are measured around all 
German airports, and these data are maintained by the respective Länder (in Schönefeld’s 
case, Land Brandenburg).  The Behörde used FBS’s noise contours to grade its 
remuneration scale for its affected citizens. 
                                                 
154 Kerber, M., FBS (personal communication 3 Apr 2006); a meeting for public officials was held in 
Brandenburg, in the village of Rangsdorf.  The meeting in Berlin occurred in Schöneweide, which is fewer 
than ten kilometers north of the Brandenburg border. 
155 Jaenicke, J., FBS (personal communication 20 Jan 2006). 
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  5a: Brandenburg noise remuneration plan 
daytime decibels compensation
70 full mandatory buyout 
65 one-time payment 
60 noiseproofing 
50 noiseproofing for bedrooms only 
Source:  FBS 
 
For BBI there are four distinct noise contours, representing different levels of 
compensation to which landowners are eligible.156  Unfortunately, the maps of the actual 
noise contours are too large and confusing to precisely reproduce in this paper. 
On 13 August 2004, the Behörde approved the plan, and was promptly sued by 
over 3,300 individuals and organizations.  The Federal Government rolled the suits into a 
class-action lawsuit, and accelerated the process to the Bundesverwaltungsgericht, the 
German supreme court.  By the time the Gericht reached its decision, on 16 Mar 2006, 
the number of complainants had nearly crested 4,000. 
At issue before the Bundesverwaltungsgericht are four complaints.  First and 
foremost is noise pollution, particularly the nature of the remuneration scheme.  
Complainants question the justification for the thresholds being where they are, as the 
perceptible distinction on either side of the cusp is indistinguishable to the human ear.  
The second issue is related to noise pollution: nightflights.  Nightflights are considered 
separate because aircraft noise is more salient when there is no background noise, which 
typically occurs during the day, and thus more apt to negatively affect property values 
and quality-of-life. 
Also in dispute is the location of the airport itself.  Development forces spared 
Schönefeld’s perimeter because international flights and air cargo were of little concern 
                                                 
156 The current remuneration scheme is subject to change, due to the Gericht decision.  A one-time 
payment is €4000 for a single-family house and €2000 for a multi-family dwelling.  Bedroom 
noiseproofing is also the remedy for having (at least) six noise events per night at 70 decibels.
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for the economy of East Germany, so current expansion is feasible.  However, 
complainants demand that BBI should not emerge from a redevelopment of Schönefeld, 
but be built anew.  They argue that it should be farther away from the city, where a more 
5b:  Possible sites for BBI.  (Schönefeld is right-center.) 
 
Source:  GEOS Berlin 
 rural geography would minimize any and all negative impacts.  Activists preferred the 
area near Jueterborg, some 40km south of Schönefeld.157
The last point of contention before the court is water.  Given the history of airport 
protest, the shade of this issue is particular to this case.  The state of Brandenburg has a 
bounty of small lakes.  Against this backdrop, there is a fear that construction at BBI will 
disrupt the water table in the area.  Indeed, FBS plans to “lower” the water table during 
construction.  To compensate for any disturbances this construction causes in local lakes, 
FBS has promised to sanitize and distribute BBI’s retained water to any lakes in need. 
                                                 
157 Rabbe, R., BADC (personal communication 27 Mar 2006) 
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Evidently, the Gericht agreed with points one and two (noise remuneration and 
nightflights), disagreed with point three (having BBI at Schönefeld).  It is yet to offer 
clear direction on point four (water). 
The author accepts that the noise remuneration may have been inadequate.  A 
potential renter or buyer could not distinguish the noise impact between, say, two 
neighboring houses that technically rest within different noise contours.  Also, perhaps 
the remuneration scheme was not monetary enough: bedroom noiseproofing may help 
quality-of-life, but do nothing to preserve property values.  The ban on nightflights is 
regretful; a more creative solution could have produced something approaching a 
win/win scenario, given that nightflights would have allowed for airport revenues that the 
nightflight-sufferers could have received.  The Schönefeld site is the best available site. 
While the development a massive greenfield site may in fact be cheaper and cause noise 
pollution to fewer persons, remotely locating a major airport would diffuse all positive 
impacts, and surely would exacerbate traffic and the emissions therein.  Finally, the 
uniqueness of the water issue makes it hard to evaluate.  The proposed water-
redistribution scheme seems, at face value, suitable. 
 
5.3. Stakeholders 
With any development as massive as an airport, the list of stakeholders easily can 
grow too long to be useful.  The following list is an attempt to identify the major 
stakeholders with their roles in BBI’s development. 
Berlin 
Land Berlin owns 37% of FBS.  It controls the planning of landside development 
within its borders, including neighborhoods near BBI such as Rudow and 
Adlershof.  The regional economy struggles and could use a boost from a 
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successful new airport.  The city government would like to have an airport 
befitting a capital of a major country, as an international gateway and a matter of 
civic pride.  The mayor, Bürgermeister Klaus Wowereit, supports BBI. 
 
Brandenburg 
Land Brandenburg owns 37% of FBS.  All of BBI’s land will lie within its 
territory.  It can approve, modify, or reject land-use plans for an airport and an 
“airport city.”  Its Planfestellungsbehörde (planning office) approved the airport 
plan in 2004 and was sued by over 3,300 individuals and organizations.  The 
regional economy struggles and could use a boost from a successful new airport. 
 
Federal Government 
The Bundesrepublik Deutschland owns 26% of FBS.  It has planned, financed, 
and built the improvements to the area’s transportation infrastructure that will 
serve BBI.  The government’s highest court ruled on the case against the planning 
office for Land Brandenburg. 
 
The municipality of Schönefeld 
Gemeinde Schönefeld, formed in 2001, incorporates seven villages to the 
immediate south of Berlin.  The portion of Flughafen Schönefeld in Land 
Brandenburg lies within this municipality’s jurisdiction, and all of BBI’s land will 
lie within its territory.  It would originate any land-use plans for an “airport city.”  
The mayor, Bürgermeister Udo Haase, supports BBI.  The municipality is a 7% 
shareholder in BADC. 
 
Residents of the village of Schönefeld 
This village lies on the northern side of the tracks of the rail serving Flughafen 
Schönefeld, away from the noise contours.  This area was targeted for 
development in the Berlin-Brandenburg regional plan of 1998, which is still on 
the books. 
 
Residents of the village of Diepensee 
This village was part of Gemeinde Schönefeld.  Its 335 persons will have their 
hometown leveled to make way for BBI’s terminal.  FBS has compensated them 
for their land and relocated them to two nearby settlements.  There was only one 
holdout. 
 
Residents of the villages of Wassmannsdorf, Selchow, and Waltersdorf 
These also belong to Gemeinde Schönefeld, and will bear the brunt of aircraft 
noise.  However, their proximity to the airport makes their land attractive for 
“airport city” development.  Their land is not yet zoned for development, but it 
will be in the Gemeinde’s upcoming comprehensive plan. 
 
Municipalities of Mahlow-Blankenfelde, Grossbeeren, Schulzendorf, and Eichwalde 
The residents of these Gemeinden compose the bulk of the complainants who 
sued to stop or alter BBI.  Their property lies within the noise contours, so its 
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value would be diminished by a dramatic increase in noise pollution, but they do 
not live close enough to BBI to be very attractive for “airport city” development. 
 
Cities of Mittenwalde and Koenigs Wusterhausen, and the municipality of Wildau 
These jurisdictions lie just south of Gemeinde Schönefeld, away from the noise 
contours.  They also are near the autobahn that forms a “beltway” around Berlin, 
so their land is attractive for “airport city” development, but this land is not yet 
zoned for development.  Each is a 1% owner of BADC. 
 
The district of Dahme-Spreewald 
Landkreis Dahme-Spreewald is the district of Land Brandenburg in which BBI 
and BADC’s partners lie.  It is a 5% owner of BADC.  The Landkreis authorizes 
building permits for development in its territory, including BBI. 
 
Berlin Area Development Company 
Formed by the New York-based Hudson Investment Group, BADC hopes to 
facilitate a public-private partnership to coordinate landside development both 
inside and outside BBI’s boundaries.  BADC does not presently own any land, but 
land acquisition remains an option.   
 
Non-resident landowners 
Several investors from elsewhere in Germany or farther away own land near BBI.  
Foreign investors have purchased land, for example, at the ingress of the future 
BBI complex and around the future autobahn’s exit for Adlershof.  Also, several 
Bavarian investors speculated on land around the village of Schönefeld in the 
early 1990s.  All are eager for the value of the land to increase in response to the 
demand of firms to locate near BBI. 
 
Lufthansa 
The major air carrier in Germany and European leader of the Star Alliance, 
Lufthansa has little business at Berlin airports, with either passengers or freight.  
It has a cargo office and a hangar at Tegel, so the airline probably would be loath 
to suffer a moving cost, given that airport’s closure. 
 
Air Berlin 
The second largest air carrier in Germany has a base of operations at Tegel, and 
probably would be loath to suffer a moving cost.  Air Berlin focuses on the 
domestic and German-Spanish markets. 
 
EasyJet 
One of the most successful LCCs in Europe, this London-based airline uses 
Schönefeld as its central European base.  A number of qualities that make 




While dedicated freighters hub at a Berlin airport, all four serve the city.  A ban 
on nightflights at Tegel and Tempelhof does not prevent TNT and FedEx, 
respectively, from using those airports several times a week.  However, a ban on 
nightflights at BBI would prohibit any dedicated freighter from hubbing there. 
 
 
5.4. Impacts from scenarios 
5.4.i. Best-case 
Berlin, Brandenburg, and the Federal Government build a great airport and 
promptly sell off majority ownership.  They also each obtain 10% control of BADC, 
and—together with Landkreis Dahme-Spreewald, Gemeinde Schönefeld, and the other 
partnering jurisdictions—work out a comprehensive plan that zones for both present and 
future development according to the localities’ plans.  This new plan allows for 
development in Wassmannsdorf, Selchow, and Waltersdorf (where noise pollution and 
development pressures cause most residents to move away, after realizing a gain from the 
sale of their properties), as well as in Mittenwalde, Koenigs Wusterhausen, and 
Wildau.  Local and non-resident landowners work with BADC to develop several off-
airport tracts, including land around the village of Schönefeld. 
British Airways sponsors dba to join the Oneworld alliance, in order to share its 
slots at BBI, thus infuriating Lufthansa and prompting them to buy Air Berlin.  Since 
nightflights would be allowed, the dedicated freighter FedEx moves its European hub to 
BBI.  EasyJet hardly can afford slots, except at odd hours, and considers moving away. 
Former Diepensee residents begin their new lives elsewhere in the region.  
Residents of Mahlow-Blankenfelde, Grossbeeren, Schulzendorf, and Eichwalde all 
suffer the noise pollution, but gain some solace from each being given 1% control of 
BADC. 
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5.4.ii. Most likely 
Berlin, Brandenburg, and the Federal Government build a great airport.  The 
two Länder, keen to maximize non-aeronautical revenues for FBS, collude to forbid 
additional off-airport development via their ultimate control of local zoning decisions.  
Landkreis Dahme-Spreewald, Gemeinde Schönefeld, and the other partnering 
jurisdictions in BADC are left to develop the 50 hectares so designated in the 1998 plan: 
the land around the village of Schönefeld.  Wassmannsdorf, Selchow, and 
Waltersdorf, where noise pollution reduces land values, battle bitterly with Brandenburg 
to allow development in the master comprehensive plan.  Little or no development occurs 
in Mittenwalde, Koenigs Wusterhausen, and Wildau.  Non-resident landowners rue 
the day they speculated on Brandenburg farmland. 
The ban on nightflights prohibits any dedicated freighter from increasing 
activity at BBI.  Lufthansa buys some slots and closely monitors BBI’s popularity, 
particularly with Polish passengers, who otherwise might fly with its ally LOT.  Air 
Berlin threatens to move its base to Hamburg, Leipzig or Cologne-Bonn, but decides 
against it because the goodwill of its brand name is location-specific.  EasyJet easily can 
afford slots, and does quite well. 
Former Diepensee residents begin their new lives elsewhere in the region.  
Residents of Mahlow-Blankenfelde, Grossbeeren, Schulzendorf, and Eichwalde all 
suffer the noise pollution, but not at night. 
5.4.iii. Status quo 
Berlin, Brandenburg, and the Federal Government abandon plans to build 
BBI, due to political pressure to keep Tegel open, the daunting price tag, and airline 
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fallout from the ban on nightflights.  Since nightflights still are allowed at Schönefeld, the 
dedicated freighter FedEx considers moving its European hub there. 
Landkreis Dahme-Spreewald, Gemeinde Schönefeld, and the other partnering 
jurisdictions in BADC are left to develop the 50 hectares so designated in the 1998 plan: 
the land around the village of Schönefeld.  However, the two Länder are not hostile to 
(merely disinterested in) more off-airport development in the future.  While this comes as 
hopeful news to some in Wassmannsdorf, Selchow, and Waltersdorf, as well as in 
Mittenwalde, Koenigs Wusterhausen, and Wildau, no concerted plans develop and 
little land amalgamation occurs.  Non-resident landowners rue the day they speculated 
on Brandenburg farmland. 
Lufthansa continues its historic disinterest in Berlin.  Air Berlin continues its 
success at Tegel, where operations become quite expensive, due to constrained supply 
and growing demand.  Air Berlin and dba consider moving some or all operations to 
Schönefeld.  EasyJet easily can afford slots at Schönefeld, and does quite well. 
Former Diepensee residents begin their new lives elsewhere in the region, rather 
upset that their homes were destroyed for naught.  Residents of Mahlow-Blankenfelde, 
Grossbeeren, Schulzendorf, and Eichwalde all suffer the same noise pollution as 







6. Conclusions, recommendations, and lessons for the United States 
 
BBI could become a regional economic driver, but most likely it will not.  Its 
concentration of commercial aviation in greater Berlin should result in the transfer of 
airport-related economic activity from Tegel and Tempelhof.  However, further 
development of the land between the airport and Berlin probably will be curtailed.  
Freight activity will be minimal, just as it currently is.  Passenger activity is apt to keep 
pace with the purchasing power of Berliners and Brandenburgers as well as the status of 
Berlin as a tourist destination; the recent LCC boom should plateau in the near future. 
Although the closure of Tegel is a major component of the plan for BBI, it could 
be useful for Berlin visitors and residents to maintain it with a smaller incarnation.  
Presently Tegel is Berlin’s primary airport, but perhaps it could a “new” secondary 
airport.  So as not to threaten the viability of BBI, its slots and land-use could be altered.  
For instance, the hours of operation could be further truncated.  Tegel could be preserved 
for LCCs and general aviation (recreational civil flight)—or at least preserved to perform 
such a function, if BBI becomes so successful that LCCs get priced out of their slots. 
Just because Berlin is not a global city does not mean that it cannot have a 
“global” airport.  For example, being a transfer hub of a major air carrier has made 
Frankfurt/Main one of Europe’s leading airports, yet it primarily serves a city with only 
650,000 residents.158  Freight hubs often serve even smaller cities, such as Memphis, 
Liege, and Anchorage, yet give their airports a central role in global supply chains.  Alas, 
Berlin has no home carrier with hubbing capacity, and its prohibition of nightflights is 
effectively a prohibition of being a freight hub. 
                                                 
158 http://www.statistik-hessen.de 
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Also, an “airport city” development is not an option exclusive to major hubs—
Stockholm, Helsinki and Barcelona each have successful airport cities.159  The impact of 
an airport city is most positively affected by the role of air freight, but even with minimal 
cargo activity BBI and its airport city still can attract firms.  Importantly, it will be a 
superb, multimodal node in the regional transportation infrastructure.  The challenge then 
is to make the most of this position, and ideally to have its various political entities and 
landowners work together—or at least not against each other.  Their goal should be a 
coherent, if not cooperative, vision of what will both determine and resemble the region’s 
spatial structure, economic development, and market demands.  At time of writing, the 
author is not optimistic such a vision involves as great an airport city as could be built. 
This case study is unique in some respects, which one would strain to compare to 
other cities in Europe or elsewhere.  Berlin’s dramatic political history has shaped the 
nature of its airports—and indeed its entire spatial-economic structure—that another city 
could not duplicate (nor should it want to do so).  While the closure of small, centrally 
located airports is normal (Tempelhof, Miegs, e.g.), complete airport consolidation for a 
major metropolitan area is rare.  Also, Berlin is replete with big projects—having the 
ambition, resources, and political resolve to bite off more than what the average city 
might be willing or able to chew. 
In BBI’s case the legal process, not a violent showdown with police, resolved the 
anti-airport protest.  One of the central issues—if not the central issue—of the legal 
decision is the permissibility of nightflights.  Popular protest to nightflights (or to noise 
pollution in general) is common in the US, and can be seen as part of a democratic 
process of citizens’ registering their grievances with the government or their faith in the 
                                                 
159 Güller & Güller 2003. 
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judicial system.  However, it also exposes the need to inform the public about the positive 
impacts an airport with nightflights can have on the regional economy, which indirectly 
might improve land values and job prospects.  While their prohibition subverts any 
concept of air cargo that landside development may have had, their permission could 
have opened the way for the negatively affected communities to share in, say, profits 
from such development.  In other words, the compensation mechanism for the negative 
impacts of nightflights (noise pollution) could come from the positive impacts of 
nightflights (economic development spurred by air cargo).  At least theoretically, this 
would internalize the externality, while simultaneously stimulating interjurisdictional 
cooperation. 
The case of BBI makes evident that individuals will protest against aircraft noise, 
and the matter will be resolved in court.  Airport planners should work towards making 
the pre-trial phase of the development process as inclusive and educative as possible.  For 
instance, do not hold public hearings in the city of Berlin on an airport to be built in semi-
rural Brandenburg; this reinforces the notion that the airport is “for” Hauptstädte 
Berliners.  If the issue is remuneration, the problem can be solved; however, if the issue 
is an insult or dismissal, the problem can prove intractable.  To its credit, FBS 
emphasized job creation to BBI’s neighbors; perhaps an earlier and more overt method—
direct hires from the negatively affected villages, for example—would argue the point 
more convincingly.  Not every German village houses a Boeing mechanic, surely, but 
locals may appreciate merely the gesture or opportunity.  Make it their airport. 
BBI has themes applicable to other areas, particularly the US, and they 
demonstrate the challenges of airport redevelopment in a democratic society or federal 
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system.  The difficulty of multiple, oftentimes competing, political jurisdictions working 
together on airport development is a common problem, particularly since a new jetport 
often sits outside the city limits of the population center it serves.  Regional planning can 
help to morph competition into cooperation.  However, although Berlin and Brandenburg 
jointly produce regional plans, such plans can express more political compromise than 
developmental vision. 
Such interjurisdictional competition can be exacerbated by divergent interests on 
either side of the airport’s boundaries, as landside development is apt to bring a coveted 
windfall of non-aeronautical revenue to its executors.  When the developer is the public 
sector (i.e., when the airport authority is part of the same government that determines off-
airport land-use), problems can arise.  Indeed, most airports in the US and Canada are run 
by the public sector or government-sanctioned “independent” authorities.  Airport 
privatization would remove much of that conflict-of-interest.  Also, a public-private 
partnership for landside development (BADC and SADC, e.g.) is a good practice, but it 
first requires a consensus-driven confederation—always a challenge. 
As much as is possible across countries and continents, one can compare the cities 
and airport systems of Berlin and Washington, DC.  Each is capital of a rich country and 
home to cultural treasures, yet each capital is not the primate city of its national economy.  
Greater Berlin and greater Washington are roughly the same size, in both population and 
acreage.  Both metropolitan areas have three airports, which seem to serve different 
functions or historical catchments.  While FBS manages all three Berlin airports, in 
Washington two separate governmental entities run the region’s three airports.  The 
Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority operates Washington/Dulles and 
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Washington/National, both of which lie in Virginia.  The region’s third airport is 
Baltimore/Washington (BWI), run by the state of Maryland.  BWI is analogous to 
Schönefeld, as its Southwest Airlines presence compares to EasyJet, and its role as the 
main Maryland airport is like Schönefeld’s being the main East German airport.  
Although remote from Washington, Dulles would be Tegel, being the newest and most 
intercontinental.  National is a successful version of Tempelhof: very close to the city 
center, but surrounded by water and parkland, not housing. 
Airport redevelopment—as opposed to new development—is the norm, if not the 
rule, in both Europe and North America.  In the US there have been only three “new” 
airports since Dallas-Ft.Worth, which opened in 1973.160  The particular challenge of a 
redevelopment is that an existing airport abuts denser development than does an exurban 
greenfield.  Often this development would not have occurred on nearly the same scale if 
it were not for the airport’s existence: US examples feature Chicago/O’Hare and 
Washington/Dulles.  Ironically, such airport-related development later threatens the 
airport’s existence, especially when the airport must expand or redevelop to stay 
attractive to airlines and passengers.  The case of BBI shows that a redevelopment can be 
stymied by a legal settlement.  Yes, the airport may be built.  But should it?  Without 
nightflights, and with the Länder subverting local development goals, perhaps not.  It is a 
€2 billion question with no clear answer.  Yet the question will be asked again and again, 
by cities all over the world.  So if there is no clear answer, let this paper be a clear 
warning. 
 
                                                 
160 FAA. 1999. Press Release.  http://www.faa.gov/news/news_story.cfm?type=press_release&region 
=southwest&year= 1999&date=122199. Last accessed 10 Apr 2006.  The three “new” US airports are 
Denver (1995), Northwest Arkansas (1998), and Austin (1999). 
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The following data is for large German airports in 2005, from ADV and the OAG 
flight guide.  “Pax” is short for passengers. 
 
       8a: 




ratio Domestic pax shDomes shIntl 
       
DUS 15.511 20 0.776 3.6 23% 77%
FRA 52.219 14 3.73 7.02 13% 87%
HAM 10.676 10 1.068 4.53 42% 58%
HAJ 5.6374 6 0.94 1.12 20% 80%
CGN 9.4522 12 0.788 3.44 36% 64%
MUC 28.619 12 2.385 9.07 32% 68%
STR 9.4059 7 1.344 2.86 30% 70%
Berlin 17.153 10 1.715 6.71 39% 61%
 
Airport Daily flights 
Daily 
destinations transfer M kg cargo AusserEuropa shIntercont 
       
DUS 401 85 7% 32.151 1.48 10%
FRA 1124 219 52% 1864.6 20.4 39%
HAM 299 64 2% 24.216 0.24 2%
HAJ 117 36 2% 6.056 0.32 6%
CGN 161 57 2% 636.89 0.12 1%
MUC 830 139 25% 202.84 4.1 14%
STR 241 67 2% 16.681 0.51 5%








     
DUS 200,621 77 185988 83
FRA 490,147 107 475591 109
HAM 156,180 68 132735 80
HAJ 88,936 63 70310 79
CGN 154,594 61 137590 68
MUC 398,838 72 374626 76
STR 160,405 59 127478 73








8b: ADV data for 2005 
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8.2. Worldwide airport rankings 
 
Airports in Europe are in bold, those in Asia are in italics, and those in North America 
are in regular type. 
 
8c: Total passenger traffic, 2004 
 
Rank City / airport Country Code Passengers 2000 rank 
      
1 Atlanta USA ATL 83,606,583 1 
2 Chicago / O'Hare USA ORD 75,533,822 2 
3 London / Heathrow UK LHR 67,344,054 4 
4 Tokyo / Haneda Japan HND 62,291,405 6 
5 Los Angeles USA LAX 60,688,609 3 
6 Dallas-Ft.Worth USA DFW 59,412,217 5 
7 Paris / Charles de Gaulle France CDG 51,260,363 8 
8 Frankfurt / Main Germany FRA 51,098,271 7 
9 Amsterdam Holland AMS 42,541,180 10 
10 Denver USA DEN 42,393,766 11 
11 Las Vegas USA LAS 41,441,531 12 
12 Phoenix USA PHX 39,504,898 15 
13 Madrid Spain MAD 38,704,731 20 
14 Bangkok Thailand BKK 37,960,169 26 
15 New York / Kennedy USA JFK 37,518,143 21 
16 Minneapolis-St.Paul USA MSP 36,713,173 13 
17 Hong Kong China HKG 36,711,920 22 
18 Houston USA IAH 36,506,116 17 
19 Detroit USA DTW 35,187,517 16 
20 Beijing China PEK 34,883,190 - 
21 San Francisco USA SFO 32,247,746 9 
22 New York / Newark USA EWR 31,947,266 18 
23 London / Gatwick UK LGW 31,461,454 23 
24 Orlando USA MCO 31,143,388 24 
25 Tokyo / Narita Japan NRT 31,057,252 - 
26 Singapore Singapore SIN 30,353,565 28 
27 Miami USA MIA 30,165,197 19 
28 Seattle USA SEA 28,804,554 29 
29 Toronto Canada YYZ 28,615,709 27 
30 Philadelphia USA PHL 28,507,420 - 
Total passengers enplaned and deplaned.    
Passengers in transit counted once.     










8d: Total cargo traffic, 2004 
 
Rank City / airport Country Code Tons 2000 rank 
      
1 Memphis USA MEM 3,554,575 1 
2 Hong Kong China HKG 3,119,008 2 
3 Tokyo / Narita Japan NRT 2,373,133 4 
4 Anchorage USA ANC 2,252,911 7 
5 Seoul South Korea ICN 2,133,444 5 
6 Los Angeles USA LAX 1,913,676 3 
7 Paris / Charles de Gaulle France CDG 1,876,900 11 
8 Frankfurt / Main Germany FRA 1,838,894 8 
9 Singapore Singapore SIN 1,795,646 9 
10 Miami USA MIA 1,778,902 10 
11 Louisville USA SDF 1,739,492 12 
12 New York / Kennedy USA JFK 1,706,468 6 
13 Taipei Taiwan TPE 1,701,020 16 
14 Shanghai China PVG 1,642,176 - 
15 Chicago / O'Hare USA ORD 1,474,652 13 
16 Amsterdam Holland AMS 1,467,204 15 
17 London / Heathrow UK LHR 1,412,033 14 
18 Dubai UAE DXB 1,169,286 - 
19 Bangkok Thailand BKK 1,058,145 23 
20 New York / Newark USA EWR 984,838 18 
21 Indianapolis USA IND 932,449 17 
22 Osaka Japan KIX 887,819 19 
23 Atlanta USA ATL 862,230 21 
24 Tokyo / Haneda Japan HND 774,113 26 
25 Dallas-Ft.Worth USA DFW 742,289 20 
26 Luxembourg Luxembourg LUX 712,985 - 
27 Beijing China PEK 668,690 25 
28 Kuala Lumpur Malaysia KUL 655,368 - 
29 Oakland USA OAK 644,753 28 
30 Guangzhou China CAN 632,372 - 
Total cargo is loaded and unloaded freight and mail.    
Figures for Anchorage include cargo in transit.    













8.3. Freedoms of the Air 
 
The First: The right or privilege, in respect of scheduled international air services, 
granted by one State to another State or States to fly across its territory without landing. 
 
The Second: The right or privilege, in respect of scheduled international air services, 
granted by one State to another State or States to land in its territory for non-traffic 
purposes. 
 
The Third: The right or privilege, in respect of scheduled international air services, 
granted by one State to another State to put down, in the territory of the first State, traffic 
coming from the home State of the carrier. 
 
The Fourth: The right or privilege, in respect of scheduled international air services, 
granted by one State to another State to take on, in the territory of the first State, traffic 
destined for the home State of the carrier. 
 
The Fifth: The right or privilege, in respect of scheduled international air services, 
granted by one State to another State to put down and take on, in the territory of the first 
State, traffic coming from or destined to a third State. 
 
The Sixth: The right or privilege, in respect of scheduled international air services, of 
transporting, via the home State of the carrier, traffic moving between two other States. 
 
The Seventh: The right or privilege, in respect of scheduled international air services, 
granted by one State to another State, of transporting traffic between the territory of the 
granting State and any third State with no requirement to include on such operation any 
point in the territory of the recipient State, i.e., the service need not connect to or be an 
extension of any service to/from the home State of the carrier. 
 
The Eighth: The right or privilege, in respect of scheduled international air services, of 
transporting cabotage traffic between two points in the territory of the granting State on a 
service which originates or terminates in the home country of the foreign carrier or (in 
connection to the Seventh Freedom) outside the territory of the granting State. 
 
The Ninth: The right or privilege of transporting cabotage traffic of the granting State 














8e: Berlin in Germany     8f: Cold War Berlin 
     
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/   Source: http://www.historywiz.com/yalta 
 Image:Germany_Länder_Berlin.png 
 




8h: Diepensee dismantled 
 
Source: Berliner Zeitung, 24 Feb 2004, p.20 (Max Lautenschlaeger) 
 107
